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Abstract 
This thesis does a rhetorical analysis of Michael Moore’s Fahrenheit 9/11 to 
understand its failure to achieve its goal of a George W. Bush defeat in the 2004 
election.  To do this I outline a theory of counternarrative which relies on argument 
theory to understand the resolution of competing narratives.  I begin by creating a 
nuanced theory of counternarrative which relies on informal logic and Ralph 
Johnson’s dialectical tier.  Then I look at the construction of Bush’s official narrative 
from his public speeches beginning on September 20, 2001 through the invasion of 
Iraq.  After detailing Bush’s narrative I analyze the moments of argumentative clash 
between it and Fahrenheit 9/11.  I conclude that the failure of Moore’s 
counternarrative was inevitable due to its poor argument construction and omission of 
the dialectical tier.   
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Chapter One: An Introduction to the Rhetoric of Fahrenheit 9/11 
In the aftermath of September 11, President Bush accomplished three 
important tasks:  he comforted the citizens of the U.S., provided a frame to 
understand the events of 9/11 and pursued his agenda without opposition.  Murphy 
(2003) explains “Bush felt the need to define the meaning of 9/11 and we felt the 
need to understand this horrific event….Bush crafted our interpretation of this 
attack….Framing the attacks as a biblical test of a chosen people made them 
comprehensible” (pp.610-11).  If Americans are the chosen people then whoever 
attacked had to be evil.  By framing the attacks as a test of American moral character, 
Bush was able to define the world in terms of the moral against the immoral.  Bush’s 
Manichean view of the world is exemplified by the statement “Either you are with us, 
or you are with the terrorists” (Bush, 2001, ¶ 30).  Because Bush was able to comfort 
and explain the tragedy of 9/11 to the American public, they rewarded him with some 
of the highest approval ratings ever recorded for a President (Murphy, 2003).  In this 
rhetorical environment, deliberation and dissent were actively discouraged.  The lack 
of deliberation was evident in the near unanimous vote to invade Afghanistan.  From 
Afghanistan to the invasion of Iraq, the Bush administration controlled the rhetorical 
landscape.  While there were mass demonstrations against the war in Iraq the media 
was complicit in Bush’s aggressive unilateral policy, until 2004.  During the election 
summer of 2004, Michael Moore and LIONSGATE films released the documentary 
Fahrenheit 9/11.  Fahrenheit did something no other movie has ever done in an 
election cycle: it attempted to unseat an elected president.  On the one hand, 
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Fahrenheit has been described as an “angry satirical broadside against the Bush 
administration” (Editors, 2004, p. 1) while on the other some call it “his best movie—
funny, heart breaking, outraged, and outrageous” (Pollitt, 2004, p. 12).  Finding 
meaning and making sense of conflicting stories about the world can be difficult, but 
not impossible.  In this thesis, I will examine Fahrenheit 9/11 as a counternarrative to 
the Bush administrations’ narrative and seek to explain why it did not work.  By using 
Moore’s Fahrenheit as my case study, I will establish guidelines for what is a 
counternarrative while using narrative fidelity, probability, and rational argument 
testing to explore the force of counternarrative.  Lastly, I will analyze the criteria for 
evaluating the narrative and counternarrative dialectic. 
     Literature Review  
 While there has been a lot written about Fahrenheit 9/11 there have been no 
rhetorical critiques of the film.  Literature written on the movie can be broken up into 
two basic categories: popular and scholarly.  The popular literature ranges from the 
New York Times to the National Enquirer but scholarly literature is limited due the 
movie’s recency.  
Popular Literature 
 Fahrenheit 9/11 is polysemic.  However, for this thesis I am not interested in 
the positive reviews of the movie.  It is my goal to understand why the movie failed to 
achieve the director’s goal of creating a grassroots movement which would oust 
President Bush from office in the 2004 election.  For this reason I want to assess the 
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negative reviews of the movie.  So I chose reviews from Michael Isikoff from 
Newsweek, and a Christopher Hitchens article from Slate.com.  I chose Newsweek 
because it is one of the most read periodicals in America.  From Slate.com I chose 
Christopher Hitchens (2004a) article “Unfahrenheit 9/11: The lies of Michael Moore” 
because it is a representative critique of Fahrenheit. 
 Newsweek has a circulation of “more than 4 million and a total readership of 
more than 21 million” (“History of Newsweek” 2005).  Christopher Hitchens’, one of 
the most outspoken critics of Fahrenheit, wrote one of the most quoted articles 
against Moore’s character and his movie.  Each publication is unique in its approach 
to Fahrenheit 9/11 but together they form a representative critique of Moore’s 
documentary by the mainstream media.  Although this list is not exhaustive it will 
index the reception of Moore’s movie. 
Academic Literature 
  G. Thomas Goodnight (2005) has written the only analysis of Fahrenheit done 
by a rhetorician that I could find at the time of this writing.  Even though it is not a 
rhetorical analysis, Goodnight (2005) examines how celebrities advocate their values 
through their work using The Passion of the Christ and Fahrenheit 9/11 as case 
studies.  Goodnight (2005) explains that the focal point of his argument is the public 
sphere and deliberative democracy: “The aim of the article is to discover how the 
constraining conventions of television and the practices of film in 2004 collaborated 
at election time in the peaceful transfer of power so that we may begin to speak more 
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freely about democratic politics in a time of war” (p. 410).  Goodnight (2005) never 
addresses the use of narrative or counternarrative.  Moreover, he almost exclusively 
focuses on ethos as the main component to persuasion.  My case study will differ in 
its focus and its examination of persuasive strategies.  Holbert & Hansen (2006) 
examine the effects of Fahrenheit 9/11 on political priming, party affiliation, and 
candidate choice.  Holbert and Hansen provide some insight into how the audience 
reacted to certain parts of the film; however, it is a quantitative approach to Moore’s 
message, and does not seek to understand why Moore’s movie failed to create a 
groundswell against Bush.  Rhoads (2004), a psychologist, analyzes the question of 
Michael Moore’s effect on the election.  Rhoads’ analysis is about the backlash that 
Moore may have created with his movie: 
Did Michael Moore actually help George W. Bush win another four years as 
president?  Cokie Roberts gave public voice to what had been whispered on 
the internet since the election: ‘I think that Michael Moore had a very major 
impact—a negative impact—on the Democratic Party’ she said.  ‘I think he 
exemplified all of the things that people hate about Democrats.’  (Rhoads, 
2004, p. 1)   
 The main line of thought, which frames Rhoad’s article, is analyzing the backlash 
against Moore.  Most of the article cites historical examples of persuasive backlash 
and compares those to this past presidential election and Fahrenheit 9/11.  Along this 
same trajectory is a recent article written by Koopman et al. (2006) which investigates 
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the immediate effects of viewing Fahrenheit by surveying respondents at four 
California theaters instantly after the movie.  The Koopman et al article can be used 
to identify parts of the movie that people found persuasive.  Neither this article nor 
the Rhodes article evaluates Fahrenheit 9/11 from a rhetorical perspective nor do they 
attempt to chart the persuasive strategies of the film.     
 There is also an entire issue of Film &History (2005) dedicated to Fahrenheit 
9/11.  In one article, Toplin (2005) outlines the battle over the production of 
Fahrenheit.  He also explains that the battle over Fahrenheit in the media is political 
and not aesthetic.  One of the few articles that deal with the message is an article by 
Nolley (2005).  Nolley runs a listserv called H-Film, on which he asked for readers to 
respond about the film.  He found that many of the conservative arguments against 
the film were really against the filmmaker.  This is important because most of the 
literature against Fahrenheit claims that Moore lied outright and tried to smear the 
president.  Nolley (2005) answers this claim by stating that Moore enjoyed a certain 
amount of directorial freedom.  In the end none of these articles even attempts a 
rhetorical analysis.   
 Finally, Toplin’s (2006) book is about the historical context and implications 
of the movie.  Toplin (2006) begins his analysis with Moore’s outburst at the Oscars 
and tracks the historical arc from that point until the election.  By the end of his book, 
Toplin hypothesizes about the implications of Moore’s film on future documentary.  
While this book is a helpful resource it does not examine the rhetorical implications 
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of Fahrenheit.  My thesis and Toplin’s book will complement each other by 
analyzing the implications of Fahrenheit to rhetorical and film scholars.   
Counternarrative 
 Fisher (1984) tells us “that man is in his actions and practice, as well as his 
fictions, essentially a story telling animal” (p. 1).  Recognition of humanity’s 
storytelling disposition can help us understand the form and social function of 
narratives.  Narratives have a significant impact on shaping our understanding of the 
political process (Bennett & Edelman, 1985; Bormann, 1985; Fisher, 1984, 1985, 
1987; Rowland, 1988; Warnick, 1987).  “Stories are among the most universal means 
of representing human events.  In addition to suggesting an interpretation for a social 
happening, a well crafted narrative can motivate the belief and action of outsiders 
toward the actors and events caught up in its plot” (Bennett & Edelman, 1985, p. 
156).  Often we find ourselves in a situation that traditional rationality can not explain 
(Fisher, 1985).  Even though many authors feel that rationality and argument are 
equally valid methods of unpacking rhetoric and film (Rowland, 1988, 1989; Warnick 
1987) there are just some arguments that are valid but unpersuasive and vice versa; 
the narrative paradigm helps us understand why and how these phenomenon happen.  
Narratives make arguments, and we can judge the quality of those arguments by 
applying rational argument testing and the dialectical tier (Govier, 2005; Johnson, 
2000; Rowland, 1988).  While the narrative paradigm is useful we can build upon this 
 7 
 
concept by establishing how the narrative dialectic functions to privilege certain 
narratives by including the concept of the counternarrative.   
 Lankshear and Peters (1996) have expanded the idea of the narrative to 
include counternarrative.  They begin their analysis of the counternarrative from the 
philosophical perspective of postmodernism and outline two basic functions of the 
counternarrative which are “to counter metanarratives” and “to counter official 
narratives” (p. 2-3).  Drawing heavily on the work of Lyotard (1984) they eschew the 
existence of metanarratives.  They point to the “endless proliferation of subcultures 
and groups” (p. 3) each with its own story as evidence that metanarratives no longer 
exist.  It is their contention, as well as Lyotard’s, that this proliferation of narratives 
has lead to a legitimation crisis of  metanarratives which bind a culture together and 
serve as the foundation of knowledge production ( Lankshear & Peters, 1996; 
Lyotard, 1984).  “‘The Postmodern Condition’ is, above all, a critique of the 
Enlightenment metanarratives which by virtue of their alleged totality, universality, 
and absolutist status are rendered ahistorical, as if their formation took place outside 
of history and of social practice.  Lyotard questions the dogmatic basis of these 
metanarratives, and exposes their ‘terroristic’ and violent nature, by which they assert 
certain ‘Truths’ from the perspective of one discourse by silencing or excluding 
another “(Lankshear & Peters, 1996, p. 9).  While drawing on postmodernism 
Lankshear & Peters (1996) want to stress their “incredulity” to official narratives but 
do little in the way of helping us understand how an official narrative or 
counternarrative works.  Even if their analysis of the historical and cultural climate is 
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correct, we still need to understand the place of symbol use in counternarrative 
formation and circulation.  It is in this niche that this essay will be useful.  It is my 
contention that we can use narrative and rational argument testing to explain how and 
when audiences will be moved to dissent or acquiesce to counternarratives.  If we 
believe that man is essentially a storytelling animal (Fisher, 1984) then the need to 
understand how one narrative becomes privileged over another is a fundamental 
epistemological question. 
 My thesis will examine the way in which counternarratives emerge as direct 
responses to official narratives.  The counternarrative is a direct rejoinder to a 
narrative argument.  Since it is widely understood that narratives argue (Bennett & 
Edelman, 1985; Bormann, 1985; Fisher, 1984, 1985, 1986; McGee & Nelson, 1985; 
Rowland, 1988; Warnick, 1987) it seems reasonable to believe that narratives would 
materialize as responses to arguments.  By applying the dialectical tier and rational 
argument testing to Fahrenheit, I hope to understand how its narrative structure and 
persuasive strategies work throughout the text.  Additionally,   I hope to use 
mainstream criticisms of the movie to show the structure of this narrative dialectic 
and to explain the emergence of counternarratives in the political realm.  This study 
will provide some insight on why some narratives persuade and others fade away.  
Justification of Text 
 Burke (1967) wrote that literature is fundamentally equipment for living.  In 
doing so he wanted to call attention to our usage of literature as a strategy or attitude 
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that informs our understanding of the world.  Young (1997, 2000) and Brummett 
(1984, 1985) have stretched this concept to include television and film by arguing, 
“Stories do not merely pose problems, they suggest ways and means to resolve the 
problems insofar as they follow discursively a pattern that people might follow in 
reality” (Brummett, 1984, p. 164).  In the electronic age the media plays a central role 
in public deliberation and formation of public opinion (Delicath and Deluca, 2003; 
Brummett, 1984, 1985; Murphy, 2003; Young, 1997, 2000).  The power of films and 
specifically documentary to shape the public’s perception of politics has been well 
documented since Leni Riefenstahl’s documentary exalting Hitler’s Nazi Germany, 
Triumph of Will.  Lynn Higgins (2005) explains that in the post 9/11 world our 
attachment to the image becomes an attachment to constructed reality: “In the post-
9/11 historical moment, it seems to me that the stakes have been raised, reality has 
become ever more inaccessible, and the widespread hunger for images reflecting 
reliable information is correspondingly acute” (p. 27).  These constructed meanings 
of past events can have a profound effect on how we predict and act upon the future.  
When audiences watch documentaries, they are participating in the reinterpretation 
and retelling of history.  This can be a devastating problem when there are fewer rules 
of objective content and journalistic integrity.   
 In the postmodern cultural moment an in-depth analysis of how 
counternarratives function can be a helpful methodological tool for understanding our 
cultural values and beliefs.  I argue that Fahrenheit 9/11 and its responses are an 
appropriate space to develop a more nuanced theory of counternarratives.  There are 
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three reasons for choosing to analyze this counternarrative over others.  First, 
analyzing Fahrenheit will allow us to merge some of the elements of the postmodern 
counternarrative and traditional rhetorical analysis by focusing on a contained 
narrative dialectic.  Because it is a singular narrative argument attempting to persuade 
audiences on a particular issue it is easier to track how this counternarrative 
circulates.  By examining both the counternarrative and its responses, we can build a 
theory of the counternarrative dialectic and explain how one narrative can hold sway 
over another.  Second, Fahrenheit 9/11 was perhaps the most controversial moment 
of dissent against the Bush administration since the bombing of the World Trade 
Center, and since this is an essay about narratives which run in opposition to official 
narratives, Fahrenheit seems to lend itself to my analysis.  Finally, it is important 
from a pedagogical standpoint to understand the influence that the entertainment 
industry has on shaping our cultural frames.  Grossberg (1993) reminds us of three 
important points: first we must understand that reality is made through human action; 
second the popular is the terrain on which people live and where political struggles 
are carried out; and third we must place particular practices into particular contexts.  
By doing these things we can analyze how cultural artifacts such as film, 
documentaries, books, and television can affect our lives and shape our frames of 
acceptance.   
 Movies often have political messages and documentaries even more so but 
they all follow the narrative form.  The past few years have seen a resurgence of the 
documentary, and these documentaries are more political than those of the past 
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(Higgins, 2004).  Documentaries have a main character, a setting, and even a plot.  
Fahrenheit is no different.  Michael Moore places himself and his politics at the 
center of his film as the protagonist and the Bush administration as the antagonist.  
Moore becomes the everyman attacking the corporate structure and politics of the 
Bush administration.  The setting is more ephemeral than the characters but the 
landscape of American politics is where this drama unfolds.  Lastly, the plot is one 
where the protagonist tries to rally support for the overthrow of the despot King.  One 
unique feature of documentaries is the impact of the narrator.  In Fahrenheit the 
narrator, Michael Moore, plays a powerful role by creating the fabric of the story, 
deciding what is talked about and what is not.  This is amplified by the fact that he is 
also the director.  Moore uses his place as the narrator to appear omniscient while at 
the same time manipulating the visual evidence to prove his case.  
  Fahrenheit meets the standards for a political narrative.  The release of 
Michael Moore’s Fahrenheit 9/11 has provided great numbers of people in the U.S. 
the opportunity to demonstrate their opposition to the war in Iraq, the policies of the 
Bush administration, and their general disgust with the political and media 
establishment.  More than three million people viewed the film in its first weekend in 
the theaters, by all accounts overwhelmingly approving its message (Walsh, 2004, 
n.p.).  On June 28, a couple of days after Fahrenheit 9/11's premiere, Moore spoke to 
thousands of people via an Internet hookup at a national town meeting organized by 
MoveOn.org:  
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‘It was the number-one movie in every single red state in America,’ Moore 
said, as cheers went up in the room in which I was watching with about 200 
MoveOn supporters. ‘Every single state that Bush won in 2000, it was the 
number-one film in it.’ The news seemed ominous for the president; a real 
sense of excitement and hope filled the room. ‘I'm sure when the White House 
read that this morning, that was one of their worst nightmares come true,’ 
Moore said.  (York, 2005, p. 48)  
For liberal America the assault on the Bush-Cheney administration was welcomed by 
the most powerful Democrats;  “Fahrenheit 9/11 opened in Washington with an 
audience that included Democratic National Chairman Terry McAuliffe, Sens. Tom 
Daschle, Barbara Boxer, and Tom Harkin, Congressmen Henry Waxman, Charles 
Rangel, and Jim McDermott (who before the war said that he believed Saddam 
Hussein more than George W. Bush), and the 9/11 commission's most partisan 
member, Richard Ben-Veniste (Barone, 2004, p. 41).  Washington DC is not the only 
place that democrats came to supported the launch Barone (2004) continues, “The 
film received a standing ovation. In Manhattan, Democratic National Committee 
Treasurer Maureen White hosted a showing of the film for local big contributors. 
Seldom have leaders of a political party promoted a commercial film so shamelessly” 
(Barone, 2004, p. 41).  These were not the only people to see this movie.  Millions 
paid to see this movie on opening weekend, causing it to gross more over that 
weekend than any other movie; “To date Fahrenheit 9/11 is the highest-grossing 
documentary of all time, with box office receipts in excess of $100 million in the US 
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alone, surpassing the success of Moore's previous film Bowling for Columbine” 
(Barone, 2004). Moreover,  Fahrenheit 9/11 won  the best film award at the 2004 
Cannes Film Festival, the Palme d'Or,  and he  received “the longest standing ovation 
in the history of the festival” (Wilshire, 2005, p.129).   
 The controversy created by Fahrenheit 9/11 cannot be underestimated.  
Porton (2004) explains, “since the American release of Fahrenheit 9/11, Michael 
Moore has been hailed by the left as the new Tom Paine, denounced by his right wing 
opponents as the incarnation of Joseph Goebbels and Leni Riefenstahl, and compared 
by film critics to such disparate figures as Sergei Eisenstein and Kenneth Anger.  
Moore has become a lightning rod for hyperbolic praise and disgust” (p. 3).  Talking 
heads across the nation took time out of their day to praise or blast Moore.  Rush 
Limbaugh, Bill O’Reilly, and the entire Fox network immediately went on the 
offensive, comparing Moore’s movie to Nazi propaganda and stating that people who 
went to see it were “Nazi cheerleaders” (Follman, 2004).  “The news about Moore 
and Fahrenheit 9/11 has ‘legs’ as they say in the news business, because his movie 
provoked widespread debate throughout the presidential election campaign, and the 
films [sic] images of the President and the war in Iraq remain convenient points of 
reference for partisans both on the left and right” (Toplin, 2005, p. 8).  Moreover, the 
movie takes many visual potshots at Bush and his administration.  From showing 
Wolfowitz licking his comb, to Bush vacationing, to Ashcroft singing “Let the Eagle 
Soar” Moore depicts the Bush administration as one built on folly and delusional 
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nationalism.  The controversy surrounding the movie made it a huge event before it 
even opened.  
 Moore's project rests on the idea that entertainment is the most effective realm 
for political criticism (Mattson, 2004).  After 9/11, the American political landscape 
was controlled almost exclusively by the conservative agenda (Murphy, 2003).  The 
war in Afghanistan, tax cuts, increased defense spending, and rolling back 
environmental and civil protections were all part of Bush’s agenda which went 
unchallenged in the wake of 9/11.  It seemed as if there was nothing that could stop 
the machine.  Democrats, too afraid of political repercussions, gave in to Bush’s 
every whim.  The American political landscape had not been this one-sided in years 
and too often the mainstream media in this country—the press, television, and 
radio—neglected their duties of asking hard questions and dealing with larger issues 
(Editors, 2004).  So even if Moore’s movie was not the first act of dissent against the 
Bush administration following 9/11 it may have been the most sensational.  
Understanding the political environment in which this movie arose is critical for 
understanding the purpose of its counternarrative. 
Context of Fahrenheit 9/11 
 A brief sketch of Michael Moore and his movie Fahrenheit 9/11 will be 
provided in this section.  I plan to briefly cover three things: the motivation of the 
Michael Moore, the motivation for Fahrenheit 9/11, and the political context.  These 
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three elements will allow us to comprehend the political landscape in which 
Fahrenheit emerges.   
The Motivation of Michael Moore 
 Michael Moore’s movie career has been wrought with controversy, from his 
debut movie Roger & Me to Bowling for Columbine and now Fahrenheit 9/11.  
Moore attributes a lot of his motivation to his working class background (Corliss, 
2004).  Moore went to a catholic school, was an eagle scout, and was the son and 
nephew of General Motors autoworkers.  Watching Flint, Michigan crumble under 
the factory closings of G.M. prompted Moore to shoot his first movie Roger & Me.  
Roger & Me followed Moore seeking an interview with G.M. C.E.O. Roger Smith.  
Moore wanted to question him about the social and economic impact of factory 
closings in Flint.  Roger & Me, although only making $250,000, put Moore on the 
map as the premier populist agitator.  He even admits that he never had any success 
until he was 35 years old.  In fact, he claims that, “up until that point I never made 
more than $15,000 a year.  When you spend that first 17 years—in other words—half 
your life earning $15,000 or less it really doesn’t matter what kind of success you 
have after that.  It’s so ingrained in you” (Corliss, 2004, p. 69).  Moore has been 
involved in the political process since he was a teenager.  When he was 18, he ran for 
the Davison County school board, because he disagreed with a policy at the high 
school, and won, making him one of the youngest elected officials in U.S. history 
(Strauss, 2004).  Since the day Moore dropped out of the University of Michigan at 
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Flint he has been involved in politics.  He was the publisher of the Flint Voice, editor 
at Mother Jones, and even had a political show called TV Nation.  It could be said that 
Moore marches to the beat of his own drummer but this is the reason he has been able 
to speak truth to power in his own way and, “’you don't go to a gunfight with a 
slingshot.’  Moore shoots only with a camera, but it's loaded” (Corliss, 2004, p. 69).    
The Motivation for Fahrenheit 9/11 
 Michael Moore wanted Americans to vote Bush out of office.  Traditionally, 
dissent had little to do with political affiliation.  Often it had to do with a charismatic 
leader able to propose strong ideals and feasible programs of action (Nuzzo, 2005).  
Moore seems to fulfill both of these requirements; he lacks political affiliation (he 
attacks the Democratic Party as often as he does Republicans) and he is charismatic.  
Moore is not your traditional charismatic leader but his charisma comes from his 
conviction to his ideals.  Moore had one overarching motivation in the making of 
Fahrenheit; he wanted Bush out of office, “MoveOn.com organized… a virtual 
meeting with the filmmaker,  who answered questions about his film and discussed 
his hopes that viewer outrage would turn into grass-roots political efforts to vote Bush 
out of office” (Editors, 2004, p.1).  Attempting to remove a sitting president through 
unaffiliated documentary is what separates this movie from other documentaries, 
making it a unique political event.    
 Fahrenheit had critics before it was ever shown in a theatre.  One of the film’s 
notable critics was Michael Eisner, President of the Disney Corporation, because he 
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held the rights to Michael Moore and his movie. Disney owned Miramax and 
Miramax owned Moore.  Eisner claimed that Disney did not want to be associated 
with the movie because Disney, and consequently Miramax, was “non-partisan” 
(Zengerle, 2005).  However, Moore claimed that Disney “was afraid of losing its tax 
breaks it receives for its theme parks and hotels in Florida, where the president’s 
brother, Jeb Bush, is governor” (Zengerle, 2004, p. 21).  Nonetheless, “Disney 
executives indicated that they would not budge from their position forbidding 
Miramax to be the distributor of the film in North America” (Rutenberg, 2004, p. A1) 
leaving Moore to look for a North American distributor for Fahrenheit, which he 
found at LIONSGATE Films.  The New York Times was the first to break the story on 
the front page and they ran it with the headline, “Disney Is Blocking Distribution of 
Film That Criticizes Bush” (Rutenberg, 2004, p. A1).  This headline story sparked a 
nationwide debate about free speech, political integrity, Michael Moore, and most 
importantly Fahrenheit 9/11.  The Disney controversy fueled so much interest in the 
movie that when it won the Palme d’Or, the highest prize at the Cannes Film Festival, 
it made the national news (Zengerle, 2004) and set the ball rolling for a media 
spectacle.  
Political Context 
 Silberstein (2002) explains how the attacks of September 11 gave the 
administration the rhetorical force to invade Afghanistan and later Iraq.  There is no 
doubt that September 11 was a defining moment for our nation, our president, and us 
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individually.  The invasion of Afghanistan once again showed the overwhelming 
superiority of America’s war fighting capability.  Moreover, it set the stage for the 
invasion of Iraq.  Using the terror attacks as a pretext the administration attempted to 
link Saddam Hussein to Osama Bin Laden and other terrorist organizations.  Bush, 
Cheney, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, and Rice all stated publicly that they believed Saddam 
had weapons of mass destruction and would be willing to give these weapons to 
terrorists to use against the U.S.  Therefore, in the fall of 2002 President Bush began 
preparing the invasion of Iraq and on March 20th, 2003 the “coalition of the willing” 
invaded Iraq.  By April 9, television viewers were given their first good news as we 
watched American tanks roll into Baghdad and “liberate” the capital city of Iraq.  
These images were closely followed with Iraqis toppling a giant statue of Saddam 
(Rampton & Stauber, 2003).  Since the U.S. invasion of Iraq began, America has lost 
over 2,000 troops and 40,000 Iraqi civilians have been killed in Iraq (White &Tyson, 
2005; Iraqboudycount.org, 2006).  The reality of a protracted intervention into Iraq 
was the hottest topic in the election of 2004.  The political context in which Moore’s 
movie is set is one of partisan politics and enmity.  The 2004 election was unique in 
the scale and scope of media involvement in shaping public opinion from the Swift 
Boat Veterans to Michael Moore.  It seemed like partisan groups all over the 
spectrum wanted to be heard.  
 Besides the work of Moore, an unprecedented number of documentary films 
were produced in the last four years (See Greenwald’s Iraq for Sale; Jarwecki’s Why 
We Fight; and PBS’s Private Warriors).  These films look back at events but also 
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beyond the present to give words of warning toward the future.  They not only want 
to inform audiences but also to activate them.  Vietnam was a major campaign theme 
in 2004.  Both candidates were of the Vietnam generation and played different roles 
during that war.  Partisan filmmakers on both sides of the presidential election made 
films defending, even glorifying their candidates.  (Toplin, 2006, p. xx).  By 
establishing a clear context for Moore’s counternarrative, it is now possible to move 
to my plan of study for this thesis.   
 Fahrenheit 9/11 is just the tip of the iceberg in the fight that has been waging 
since 9/11 to control the meaning of the tragedy.  Silberstein (2002) explains, “This… 
is about language, about the ways language is deployed in times of a national crisis.  
In the aftermath of the events of September 11, through public rhetoric, an act of 
terror became a war; the Bush presidency was ratified…patriotism became 
consumerism, dissent was discouraged…Perhaps most importantly, and public 
language (re) created a national identity” (p. xi).  It is this process of using the public 
sphere to create reasoned narratives and counternarratives that this paper delves into 
with hopes of understanding how they function.  
Plan of Study 
 My thesis is organized into four chapters in addition to this introductory 
chapter.  Chapter 2 will develop a limited definition of the counternarrative and 
explicate guidelines for recognizing a counternarrative.  Furthermore, Chapter 2 will 
set forth the means to evaluate the narrative dialectic between a narrative and 
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counternarrative.  Chapter 3 will show how Bush constructed the official narrative 
about the meaning of 9/11.  Chapter 4 will analyze Fahrenheit 9/11 and select 
strategies used by Michael Moore to construct his counternarrative.  Chapter 4 will 
also evaluate how and why Moore’s counternarrative failed to dislodge the official 
Bush narrative.  Chapter 5 will discuss the lessons drawn from analyzing the 
strategies used by Moore.  Additionally, the theoretical and practical implications of 
these findings will be discussed.  This chapter will close with a discussion about the 
possible direction of future rhetorical studies.  
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Chapter 2: Method: The development of the counternarrative 
 Theorists have yet to tackle the problem of infusing argumentative research 
into a discussion of narrative.  While many have stated that it is a good idea to use 
rational argument testing when dealing with narrative, no one has sought to explain 
the process of narrative dialectics.  When narratives argue against other narratives 
they are in dialectic.  Dialectic in its broadest sense means: “the process of eliciting 
the truth … aimed at opening out what is already implicitly known, or at exposing the 
contradictions and muddles of an opponent’s position” (Blackburn, 1996, p. 104).  
Examining the historical, cultural, and social contexts in which narratives and 
counternarratives emerge is important to critically assessing the dialectic.  Current 
conceptions of narrative do not account for the counternarrative; instead, they analyze 
and assess narratives as monological rhetorics.  As such, they focus on their internal 
consistency and use of persuasive strategies and not the relationship to other 
narratives or external realties.  
 There are no theories on how to evaluate the process of a narrative dialectic. 
Current narrative theorists (Fisher 1984, 1987; McGee & Nelson, 1985; Rowland 
1987) hold that narratives compete for audiences but not argumentatively against 
other narratives.  For example, Fisher sets out to show how narratives gain credibility 
for audiences by relying on narrative fidelity and probability, but Fisher never 
explains what happens when two narratives compete for the same audiences or when 
these narratives argue with each other.  This chapter fills those gaps in narrative 
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theory.  I map out what a counternarrative is, discuss its functions, and propose how 
to evaluate it.  Developing a theory of counternarrative will open up the possibility of 
making narrative argument less a monological concept than a dialogical one, and it 
will make the term counternarrative methodologically useful for the rhetorical 
scholar.     
Identifying the counternarrative 
   A counternarrative must have three characteristics: (a) it must be narrative, (b) 
it must counter an official narrative, and (c) it must function to open space for 
alternative narratives to be heard by creating public debate about an official narrative.  
Before going further, it will help to begin with a definition of counternarrative.  
Lankshear and Peters (1996) define counternarrative by assigning it two functions.  
First counternarratives are meant to question the reality of a larger metanarrative; 
these narratives “take issue with narratives which have come down from 
Enlightenment” (p. 2) as their starting point.  Second counternarratives “counter not 
merely the grand narratives but also the ‘official’  and ‘hegemonic’ narratives…such 
counternarratives are as Lyotard explains little stories—the little stories of those 
individuals and groups whose knowledges and histories have been marginalized, 
excluded, subjugated, or simply forgotten in the telling of the official narratives” (p. 
2).  Narratives can serve multiple functions:  they can explain, persuade, argue, and 
teach (Kvernbekk, 2002).  However, the two primary functions of counternarrative 
are arguing against official narratives and invigorating public political debate.  
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Explaining, persuading, and teaching are all by-products of these initial functions.  
For a text to be a counternarrative it should fulfill at least one of these functions. 
Shortcomings of Current Theories of Counternarratives 
 In many cases, authors refer to a series of arguments as counternarratives even 
though they lack narrative structure (Funnell, 1998; Giroux, 1996; Lankshear & 
Peters, 1996; McLaren & Hammer, 1996; Roe & van Eeten, 2004).  In 
Counternarratives: Cultural Studies and Critical Pedagogies in Postmodern Spaces 
(1996) Lankshear and Peters propose to “turn in subsequent chapters to specific 
examples of postmodern counternarratives” (p. 30).  However, Chapter 2, “Is there a 
place for cultural studies in the colleges of education” by Henry Giroux resembles a 
long string of arguments with no attempt at narrative.  Chapter 2 justifies the use of 
cultural studies as a school of thought by giving reasons it should be adopted by 
educators.  Giroux begins with a historical account of cultural studies and its 
emergence.  He then describes the benefits of cultural studies by advancing three 
main arguments: (a) allows for increased interdisciplinary work; (b) gives us the tools 
to analyze the emerging media(ted) culture; and (c) rejects expertise in academia.  He 
concludes by showing that college educators can use cultural studies.  In no place 
does Giroux outline characters, plots, or events that create a story.  At best, we could 
attribute the historical section as fulfilling this function but it is not meant to be a 
story; instead, it is purely descriptive.  Nevertheless, Lankshear and Peters consider 
this a counternarrative because it creates space for the discussion of alternative 
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viewpoints.  However, using this standard in isolation is inadequate because it does 
not draw a bright line for what is and what is not counternarrative.  Defining 
counternarrative by function fails to create a bright line determining the boundaries of 
counternarrative.  This limits the explanatory power of a theory of counternarrative.  
Therefore, the form of a counternarrative must “consist of events, actions, intentions, 
characters, and plots.  These items are connected in some way, frequently it is 
required that they be organized in causal sequences.  The causal sequences makes 
[sic] up a meaningful, coherent whole with a beginning, middle, and an end” 
(Kverbekk, 2002, p. 651). Additionally, counternarrative must make counter-
arguments against dominant narratives.  In sum, counternarrative must be in narrative 
form and maintain the two main functions outlined earlier: challenging official 
narratives and invigorating public debate.   
   Positive Narratives and Negative Counternarratives 
  The counternarrative should be in direct response to a specific 
narrative.  It should be agonistic in nature.  To understand this more thoroughly we 
turn to argumentation theory to outline what it means to be a counterargument.  It 
might be helpful to think of narratives and arguments in two different ways.  
Narratives oriented toward only proving their conclusion are positive narratives.  On 
the other hand, narratives that refute other narratives specifically are 
counternarratives or negative narratives (Apotheloz, Brandt, and Gustavo, 1992, p. 
173). 
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   A good example of a positive narrative is the book 1984.  In 1984 Orwell 
constructs his story around a main character, Winston, who lives in a totalitarian state.  
Winston works in the records department for the Ministry of Truth in the mythical 
Oceania.  His job is to destroy all evidence that history is being changed.  When Big 
Brother, the ruling tyrant, decides that Emmanuel Goldstein (Big Brother’s former 
partner) is an enemy of the state, Winston’s job is to destroy all evidence that proves 
that Goldstein was once an ally.  Even though Winston is a member of the Party, the 
ruling class of Oceania, he never really believes their propaganda.  He keeps a 
journal, falls in love, and tries to escape the tyranny of Big Brother, all offenses that 
are punishable by death.  Eventually, Big Brother catches Winston and forces him to 
reform so that he becomes an advocate of Big Brother.  1984 is a cautionary tale 
about the power of the state and media to create a totalitarian society.  Orwell’s story 
is an allegory and the lesson is that democracy is our check against oppression.  
Because 1984 does not explicitly and directly refute any specific narrative, it is not a 
counternarrative.  It might be attempting to create space for alternative views but it is 
not explicitly and directly trying to refute an established narrative. Positive narratives 
exist within or in addition to established narratives.  Conversely, counternarratives 
attempt to displace established narratives by refuting their internal logic and form.   
 Apotheloz, Brandt, and Gustavo (1992) have defined counter-argumentation 
as “negative argumentation that attacks the reasons that can be or have been 
formulated in favor of a conclusion, and whose result is the construction of a new 
argument (a counter-argument), anti-oriented to the preceding one” (p. 173).  In this 
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light, a narrative dialectic exists when Text A, a counternarrative, counters Text B and 
then reestablishes Text B’s claims as arguments to be refuted.  In addition, following 
Freeley (2004) we can define four characteristics of refutation: identify the argument, 
state your position, introduce your evidence, and demonstrate the impact.  Refutation 
is a defining feature of counternarrative.  Counternarratives involve attacking an 
official narrative by identifying the argument in the narrative and then refuting it.  
This process can be seen in Fahrenheit 9/11.  Moore blends visual and discursive 
elements to construct direct arguments against the Bush administration’s official 
narrative of the War on Terror and Iraq. For example, when Moore shows Bush 
responding to a question about Osama Bin Laden and his whereabouts Bush says “I 
don’t think about him that much” (Moore, 2004, p. 35).  Moore then asks, “What kind 
of President was this guy who didn’t think about the man responsible for 9/11” 
(Moore, 2004, p. 35)? Then to answer his own question he jumps to another clip of 
Bush stating, “I’m a war President, I come to this office (the oval office) with war on 
my mind” (Moore, 2004, p. 36).  Moore proceeds to refute Bush’s claim that his 
administration is concerned about terrorism and Al Qaeda.  Moore reduces the entire 
Bush response to 9/11 as one motivated by money.  This is just one example of a 
counter-argument that exists in the larger counternarrative structure of the film.  It is 
also an example of what makes this movie a counternarrative and not just another 
narrative that runs alongside official narratives.  
 If we limit the discussion of counternarrative to direct response to another 
narrative then it will be easier for the rhetorical scholar to track the development of 
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argumentative narratives and their rhetorical power. This will enable us to explain 
why some are compelling.  In the case of war in Iraq, the administration couched their 
arguments in narrative fashion: Saddam as antagonist; Bush and his administration as 
protagonists; the U.S. combating a great evil; and the list goes on.  Within this larger 
narrative structure are arguments about American values and inferences about how 
we should act.  It is not coincidental that narrative has been a vehicle for axiological 
arguments because many theorists recognize the power of narrative to inculcate 
values (Bennett & Edelman (1985); Fisher, 1987, 1984; Mcgee & Nelson, 1985; 
Rowland 1987, 1988). Therefore, understanding narrative arguments and their 
rebuttals enables us to understand how narrative truth changes.  
 A limited definition of counternarrative will accrue important advantages.  
First, it will move the study of narrative from monological explanations of narrative 
to a broader definition that incorporates counternarratives.  Narrative theory must 
explain how narratives interact with each other and influence audiences.  Second, a 
limited definition provides structure.  Structure in research is important because it 
increases the explanatory power of a theory or method.  Every method focuses on a 
particular aspect of a text: narrative, metaphor, genre, and so forth.  Each examines a 
text from different perspectives and may reach different conclusions.  The method 
delimits the analysis and conclusions drawn from a theory.  This is desirable because 
not every text should be explained by narrative theory.   
Functions of the Counternarrative 
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 Counternarratives have two primary functions: refutation and invigorating 
public debate.  Counternarratives invigorate debate by drawing out contradictions and 
inconsistencies in official narratives.  This section will explain how counternarratives 
function to refute official narratives and stimulate public deliberation. 
Counternarrative as Refutation of Official Narratives 
 One function of counternarratives is refuting official narratives.  Official 
narratives are dominant narratives put forth by elites.  These narratives originate from 
the state, the educational system, the penal system, the media, the judicial apparatus, 
military, and other institutions which claim a hegemonic status in society.  Official 
narratives tend to explain the world using modernist standards of truth as developed 
during the Enlightenment.  Official narratives reinforce a view of history as universal 
and linear.  This is usually the case with narratives that governments proffer.  State 
narratives rely on Enlightenment values of progress, freedom, and reason.  Pease 
(1997) agrees by noting: “The metanarratives nations fashioned out of them 
constituted the historically effective mechanisms whereby the Enlightenment's ideals 
of freedom and equality were transmuted into universal "rights" rather than local 
demands” (p. 1).  
 Official narratives have an epistemological function that is to legitimize 
knowledge for citizens.  Because the institutions from which they originate reside in a 
place of privilege they are able to construct narratives which function to exclude other 
viewpoints and narratives.  This can be done in a single text or a bricolage of texts.  
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Their explanations of reality tend to become the “common sense” of the day.  Bush’s 
September 20, 2001 State of the Union address to the American public after 9/11 is 
one example of an official narrative explaining a particular event to a particular 
audience and functioning to create triumphal episodes where the state is embattled 
against a known or unknown enemy that must be vanquished.  Often official 
narratives are appealing “because they embody our fears, hopes and prejudices of the 
cultures in which their audiences live” (Bennett & Edelman, 1985, p. 157-158).  
These official narratives are repeated in both structure and content so often that they 
become normalized.  They become the easy explanations for publics to accept.  
  Counternarratives change public perceptions of narrative truth by exposing 
contradictions of official narratives using narrative argument.  Lyotard (1979) argues 
that narrative construction is often violent because it has to fit oppositions into its 
story.  Most often, the violence manifests itself as psychological and structural.  The 
“fitting” of oppositions often erases difference and creates a homogeneity that did not 
exist before and sometimes after.  Zizek expounds on this process by stating 
“narrative as such emerges in order to resolve some fundamental antagonism by 
rearranging its terms into a temporal succession.  It is thus the very form of narrative 
which bears witness to some repressed antagonism” (1996, p. 10).  Antagonisms are 
dialectical in nature and counternarrative exposes these antagonisms.  This has 
material consquencecs for audiences because the counternarrative-narrative dialectic 
is constitutive of their political positionality.  The designations which are created by 
this dialectic defines the audience as apathetic because they do not feel involved in 
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the process of deliberation; submissive because they do not have the resources to 
object or they benefit from official narrative; or oppositional because they have 
access to information to refute.  Counternarratives arise out of these oppositional 
audiences to challenge the validity of official narratives using argumentative 
counternarratives based on their culturally and socially specific positionality.  
Oppositional narratives often take the form of direct refutation or what I am calling 
counternarratives because they expose the contradictions and inconsistencies of 
official narratives.  These contradictions become sites of resistance and from here 
counternarratives begin to circulate, spread, and displace hegemonic narratives.    
 It is the role of the rhetorical critic to identify when and how these 
political/narrative shifts come to pass.  This is precisely why we need to infuse the 
term counternarrative with meaning, because without a language to identify the 
process it becomes harder to recognize the situations where oppositional audiences 
are using narrative to refute official stories.  This is a dangerous environment where 
shifts in narrative appear to happen rapidly and without warning.  But we know this 
does not have to be the case; rhetorical scholars armed with effective theoretical tools 
can predict these shifts in narratives and cultural practices like Burke (1939) did in 
The Rhetoric of Hitler’s Battle.   
Counternarrative Invigorates Public Debate 
 Discussion about the process of a narrative dialectic is rife with political 
implications.  Burke (1969) views dialectic as transformative which helps explain 
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how counternarratives function to dislodge official narratives and develop new 
narratives.  He argues that the dialectic constitutes a merger of dualisms that pushes 
us towards transcendence.  Counternarratives that bring localized knowledge to the 
forefront are based on rejecting common assumptions about the world.  To assume “a 
functional view of narrative conceived as a moment of argument intrinsic to reason 
and practiced especially, but not exclusively, in politics” (McGee & Nelson, 1985, p. 
140) is to understand the inherently political and public nature of narratives and 
counternarratives.  Counternarratives can contribute to politics by revealing ulterior 
motives of those who seek to create acceptance of a politics that may not be in the 
public’s best interest.  Fisher (1985) asserts, “a significant feature of compelling 
stories is that they provide a rationale for decision and actions” (p. 264).  If this is true 
then the danger of false stories can be considerable.  Counternarratives vie for 
acceptance against official narratives in the public sphere.  During this dialectical 
process audiences are forced to make a decision even if they make those decisions 
without all the available information.  Understanding this process is critical if we are 
able to understand how political landscapes change. 
How to Evaluate the Narrative-Counternarrative Dialectic 
 In evaluating the counternarrative dialectic, I will use narrative probability, 
narrative fidelity, and rational argument testing.  After I show a need for a systemic 
way to evaluate the dialectic I will show how rational argument testing and the 
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dialectical tier contribute to the process.  This process will be critical for 
understanding the dialectic when applied to narrative theory. 
 Dialectics can create tensions through the process of using arguments to 
expose contradictions and inconsistencies within narratives.  This works because it 
focuses on direct argumentation with an opponent.  Understanding narrative 
dialectically means that it is possible to advance grounded judgments of narratives.  
This position counters the postmodern impulse to tear down objective standards of 
evaluation which has undermined the ability of some scholars to make critical 
judgments about the value of a particular narrative.  For Lyotard (1979) there is no 
universal set of norms by which to ascribe value to one narrative over another; hence 
all narratives should be treated equal.  Fisher (1987) makes similar arguments in his 
book Human Communication as Narration: “no form of discourse is privileged over 
others” (1987, p. 49).  Fisher (1987) believes that privileging one narrative over 
another is philosophically and ethically bankrupt.  He argues that bad stories cannot 
have fidelity, which he defines as “whether or not the stories ring true with the stories 
they know to be true in their lives” (p. 5) because bad stories do not respect basic 
human dignity.  Fisher’s example of a bad story is Hitler s Mein Kampf, but this fails 
his own test because it held fidelity for the entire state of Germany (Burke, 1939).  
The failure of narrative rationality to account for narratives such as these only 
exemplifies the ambiguity of its system of evaluation.  However, the inability to make 
cogent decisions about value as they relate to public argument is a step toward policy 
confusion and political paralysis.  In this section I make a case for three standards 
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necessary for evaluating counternarratives: probability, fidelity, and rational argument 
testing.  Counternarratives which do not meet these standards cannot fulfill the 
functions of refuting official narratives and invigorating public debate.  
Narrative Probability 
 Fisher defines narrative probability as “whether the story hangs together” 
(1987, p. 47).  He proposes that we assess it in three ways: argumentative or structural 
coherence; material coherence, and characterlogical coherence.  Argumentative 
coherence tests if the narrative is coherent and if all parts of the narrative are 
consistent.  Material coherence compares and contrasts stories against the narrative to 
ascertain if important facts or relevant issues have been ignored.  Fisher’s test of 
material coherence is relevant to counternarratives but he never explains how 
audiences make decisions based on other stories. In fact, Fisher only uses material 
coherence to test a single narrative.  Fisher never examines how counternarratives 
displace official narratives by offering ignored issues or facts as reasons to reject 
status quo narratives.  Fisher only uses material coherence as a way to explain the 
internal consistency of a single narrative.   
 Characterlogical coherence is a test of the ethos of the characters.  Fisher 
describes its importance by stating “whether a story is believable depends on the 
reliability of characters, both as narrators and actors.  Determination of one’s 
character is made by interpretations of the person’s decisions and actions that reflect 
values” (1987, p. 47).  Olsen (2003) argues that determining narrator reliability 
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requires three points of view: the narrator, the implied audience, and the totality of the 
context.  In this respect when we attempt to determine characterlogical coherence we 
should examine what the narrator and the targeted audience believed, and the overall 
cultural/historical environment.  These elements are important for determining the 
characterlogical coherence and narrative probability overall.  Determining the other 
two types of coherence, argumentative and material, can only be assessed by using a 
form of rational argument testing.  Determining the argumentative quality of narrative 
is to test the narrative or counternarrative against all available evidence.  
Narrative Fidelity 
 Fisher (1987) uses the logic of good reasons to determine the fidelity of a 
narrative.  As mentioned above, Fisher (1987) defines “fidelity” as “whether or not 
stories ring true with the stories they know to be true in their lives” (p. 5).  Fisher 
claims, “good reasons are the stuff of stories, the means by which humans realize 
their nature as reason-valuing animals” (1984, p. 8).  He elaborates on this in his book 
by noting that “narrative rationality focuses on good reasons—elements that provide 
warrants for accepting or adhering to the advice fostered by any form of 
communication that can be considered rhetorical” (Fisher, 1987, p. 48).  He outlines 
the five tests for good reasons: (a) what are the values in the message; (b) is it 
relevant; (c) what are the consequences of adherence to this narrative; (d) is the 
narrative consistent; and (e) does the narrative outline the ideal way to act in a given 
situation (Fisher, 1987)?   
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 Fisher’s logic of good reasons does not test competing narrative claims.  
Instead, Fisher uses his logic of good reasons to test the argumentative strength of a 
narrative and its strategies, but not to resolve the struggle between narratives.  This is 
due to the fact that Fisher wants to move away from dialectical reasoning. Fisher tells 
us that we should apply the tests of fact, relevance, consequence, consistency and 
transcendent issue to every argument which involves values because this will 
determine narrative fidelity.  In other words, critics will examine the counternarrative 
to determine if the narrative “hangs together” and/or “rings true” (Fisher, 1987).  
These are good tests but they need to be supplemented with other tests which account 
for the argumentative narratives which vie for the same audiences.   
 Audiences understand the world from their particular viewpoint and through 
their own terministic screens.  This has important implications for how audiences 
evaluate a narrative dialectic because an audience’s terministic screens inform what 
they already believe to be true. Audience disposition must be taken into account in 
any persuasive act.  Narrative fidelity is most useful when it takes into account the 
world beyond the narrative itself.  Terministic screens create frames which inform 
how we understand the world.  Burke (1966) argues, “what we take as ‘reality’ may 
be but the spinning out of possibilities implicit in our particular choice of terms” (p. 
46).  Ultimately, how we view truth in the world as individuals helps structure what 
we find to be a compelling argument.  The complication of these terministic screens 
is that they are individual.  Devolving assessment to the individual leads to an infinite 
regression resulting in relativism.  So how do we overcome the relativism that is 
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inherent in this doctrine?  First, terministic screens are formed around a “collective 
revelation” (Burke, 1966, p. 53).  They are based on our experiences but there is a 
collective frame that we all share.  That frame involves language, the negative, 
narrative/dramatism, and the dialectic.  These collective frames undergird our ability 
to (inter)act, because they create norms, expectations, and community.  Audiences 
understand the world through a complex set of experiences that determine their 
assumptions about truth, reality, and politics.  Terministic screens activate meaning in 
a particular context and build that meaning into a framework by which audiences 
judge rhetorical artifacts.  Since the bombing of the World Trade Center pictures of 
firefighters may trigger a particular contextual meaning of what it means to be a 
firefighter: hero, altruism, everything that is good with humanity and Americans.  
These frames can become condensation symbols which access our value systems.  
Zarfesky (2004) explains: 
a situation can be defined by identifying it with one or more condensation 
symbols.  These are symbols which designate no clear referent but "condense" 
a host of different meanings and connotations that otherwise might diverge.  
They are particularly useful in defining an ambiguous situation because 
people can highlight different aspects of the symbol yet reach the same 
conclusion.  For example, President Clinton's approach to the budget 
surpluses of the late 1990s was "Save Social Security first."  Saving Social 
Security is a theme with positive resonance, even though people mean 
different things by it.  The symbol of saving this cherished program gathers 
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support from among people who may have different reasons for offering it and 
who may mean different things by it. The power of the definition is its ability 
to condense divergent emotional reactions.  (2004, pp. 612-613)  
Condensation symbols are crucial when dealing with a narrative argument in visual 
form because along with words pictures are used as condensation symbols.  These 
symbols get added to our experiences and become part of our terministic screens.  
 Recognizing and evaluating the counternarratives at work on any particular 
narrative is important to determine if the narrative is consistent or if the narrative 
outlines a reasonable action.  If no counternarratives exist then official narratives 
create the basis for ideal action by default, but when counterarguments and hence 
counternarratives are involved that may change how the narrative is evaluated.  
Applying the logic of good reasons tests can still be done but it should be done at the 
points of clash.  Critics should apply the tests of relevance, consequences, and action 
to specific counter-arguments.  This is the blueprint on how these public decisions 
can be, and are, made. 
Rational Argument Testing 
 To understand the argumentative role of counternarrative it is important to 
comprehend the process of argument evaluation.  By stretching the counters of 
rational argument testing to include comparing and contrasting the premises against 
each other and reality, and critically questioning its assumptions we can determine the 
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strength of any argument.  But before we can do that we need to determine what an 
argument is.      
 Govier (2005) defines argument as “a set of claims in which one or more of 
the claims, are put forward so as to offer reasons for another claim, the conclusion” 
(p. 2).  Govier’s definition outlines three fundamental parts to an argument claims, 
reasons, and conclusions.  Each argument consist of a conclusion “which premises are 
intended as support” (Govier, 2005, p.22).  In order to evaluate an argument 
accurately we must be able to standardize its form by using this premise-conclusion 
structure.  Standardizing the argument structure can be done in three steps: first 
identify the conclusion; second identify its premises of support; and third arrange the 
statements in a logical manner with the premises leading up to the conclusion; 
Placing an argument in this standardized form will allow the critic to evaluate the 
strength of the premises, conclusions, and reasons given by a rhetor in his 
construction of argument.  To determine the strength of an argument Govier argues 
that we should use three tests: acceptability, relevancy, and grounds (ARG).  The 
evaluation of argument happens when critics determine the acceptability of the 
premises and then evaluate the reasoning from premises to conclusions (Govier, 
2005).  If the premises are reasonable and the structure is good then an argument is 
considered strong or cogent.  Testing cogency of an argument is done by testing 
acceptability, relevancy, and if the premises “provide sufficient or good grounds for 
the conclusion” (Govier, 2005, p. 64).  
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 Acceptable premises are ones that would be reasonable to a reasonable person.  
In other words, an argument is acceptable if “it is reasonable for those to whom the 
argument addressed to accept the premises” (Govier, 2005, p. 63).  Govier gives 
several guidelines for testing the acceptability of premises while warning us that this 
is not a complete set of rules.  A premise may be acceptable if it is: supported by a 
cogent subargument, supported elsewhere in the literature on the topic, known to a 
priori true, common knowledge, testimony, and/or from a proper authority.  If a 
premise is supported by a cogent subargument then the rhetor must supply evidence 
and reasons that the premise is already rational and hence should be accepted.  To 
show that the claim is supported elsewhere is to reference or cite an authority on the 
topic to prove that the claim is a reasonable claim.  A priori claims are definitional or 
technical claims, which logically follow, based on the terms used.  For example, a 
square has four sides or a person cannot steal their own property.  Each of these 
statements is considered a priori because if you own the property by definition you 
cannot steal it.  In addition, if a figure is a square it must have four sides.  Using 
testimony to determine acceptability of a premise is an integral part of human 
knowledge acquisition considering we know most of what we know from what other 
people have told us about the world.  This is especially true when we deal with the 
unknown.  We accept that many objects exist that we do not have direct experience 
with because others have seen them and told us.  In determining the acceptability of 
testimony there are three important considerations.  These are plausibility of the claim 
asserted, the reputation of the person asserting the claim, and if the claim “goes 
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beyond the experience and competence of the person who tells us it is true” (Govier, 
2005, p. 138).  If the person claims something that goes beyond common knowledge 
audiences are unlikely to accept it as true.  Moreover, if a person asserting the claim 
has a poor reputation people are unlikely to accept the premises or the conclusion.  
And claims can be deemed unacceptable if they go beyond the competence or 
experience of the person making the claim.  Sometimes this may be hard to 
determine.  Govier gives the example of a journalist, David Lamb, discussing Africa 
and making this claim: “The Church did not play an active role in supporting the 
African’s struggle for independence, largely because white clergy in Africa were 
racist in attitude and approach” (2005, p. 141).  While this may be true without source 
citations or authority, this claim is unacceptable because it goes beyond his 
experience.  Experts are often a source of acceptable premises.  In the face of what 
some authors on narrative theory might argue, Fisher in particular, experts should 
have a place in determining the acceptability of a claim.  Because expertise is based 
on sustained research and recognition by their peers these scholars are able to make 
acceptable claims outside of common knowledge.  A person who studies history is 
more qualified to tell us about the causes of the civil war than an actor who 
presumably studies acting and not history.  However, appeals to authority are not 
without problems.  Often people cite experts to make claims in fields where that 
particular expert is not an expert.  In this way, the evidence is not relevant to the 
premise.   
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Relevancy is another important characteristic of a strong argument.  If a 
premise is used to support a conclusion, it seems obvious that it must be relevant to 
its conclusion.  However, in many cases rhetors use premises to argue a conclusion 
that are not relevant to each other.  In determining relevance, it is important to 
recognize that there are three types of relevance.  These are positive relevance, 
negative relevance, and irrelevance.  Positive relevance is defined as “A statement is 
positively relevant to another statement if and only if the truth of A counts in favor of 
the truth of B.  This means that A provides some evidence for B, or some reason to 
believe that B is true” (Govier, 2005, p. 172).  Negative relevance, on the other hand, 
is defined as “A statement A is negatively relevant to another statement if and only if 
the truth of A counts against the truth of B.  This means that if A is true it provides 
some evidence or reason to think that B is not true” (Govier, 2005, p. 173).  The last 
test of relevance is irrelevance.  Govier (2005) defines irrelevance as “A statement A 
is irrelevant to another statement B if it is neither positively nor negatively relevant to 
B.  When there is irrelevance, there is no relationship of logical support or logical 
undermining between the two statements.  A does not provide a reason for B; nor 
does A provide a reason against B” (p. 173).  Often rhetors use fallacies, which are 
associated with irrelevance such as straw man, guilt by association, appeals to 
authority, and appeals to ignorance.  
 The last characteristic of the ARG conditions is grounds. Grounds evaluate the 
way in which premises work together to increase or decrease the strength of an 
argument.  There are two forms of grounds: deduction and induction.  “One statement 
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deductively entails another if and only if it is impossible for the second one to be 
false, given that the first one is true” (Govier, 2005, p. 206).  Govier (2005) argues 
that if an argument is deductively valid it satisfies both the relevancy and grounds 
conditions of an argument.  For evaluation, purposes there are two different types of 
deduction: categorical and propositional.  Categorical arguments can be broken into 
four forms, which are universal affirmation, particular affirmation, universal 
negation, and particular negation.  Universal affirmation uses the term all to make 
statements like all whales are mammals.  Particular affirmations use the statement 
some to denote that some members of the one category are also part of another.  For 
example, some African Americans are male.  The universal negative can be expressed 
in many ways.  It might be no mammals lay eggs or dogs can’t fly or even there never 
was a tree that talked.  What each of these statements have in common is that each 
statement negates an entire category of objects.  The particular negative, on the other 
hand, negates only part of a category of things.  Consider, not all master’s students 
are good writers.  This statement makes clear that while not all of master’s students 
are good writers, there certainly are some who are.  When universal and particular 
affirmation and negation are all combined they create the basis for identifying, 
standardizing, and evaluating the categorical form of arguments.   
 The second form of deduction is propositional logic.  Propositional logic 
“deals with the relationships holding between simple propositions and their 
compounds.  In propositional logic, the basic logical terms are not, or, and, and 
if/then” (Govier, 2005, p. 246).  The validity of propositional logic lies in the 
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relationship of the premises to each other.  In other words, the conditional 
relationship between statements makes the argument valid.  If you eat too much then 
you will get fat.  If the condition of eating too much is fulfilled then it follows that 
you will get fat.  As long as the premises are true then the conclusions will also be 
true.  In formal logic, the discussion of propositional logic is separated as different 
types of syllogisms.  The if/then statements are called hypothetical or conditional 
syllogisms, while the use of the connector or designates the disjunctive syllogism.  
Govier refers to this type of argument as the exclusive disjunction.  She argues that 
exclusive disjunction is “true if and only if one of the disjuncts is true” (Govier, 2005, 
p. 290).  I can go either eat or play basketball.  I went to play basketball therefore I 
can not go eat.  In some instances both statements can be true.  You might be faced 
with the choice I can go play basketball or go eat.  And instead of choosing one and 
not the other you might choose both.  I called Jon and he agreed to go eat at 5 and 
Brett and I will play basketball at 9.  Govier calls these types of permutations 
inclusive disjunctions.  Now that we have examined the deductive side of argument 
form it is time to move to induction.  
 Induction is “that which we extrapolate from experience to further 
conclusions” (Govier, 2005, p. 292).  An archetypical example of induction is 
everyday the sun rises so it safe to say that tomorrow the sun will also rise.  Induction 
allows us to predict the unknown from information that is known to us.  Inductive 
arguments have the following characteristics according to Govier (2005): (1) the 
conclusion and premises are all empirical propositions; (2) the conclusion is not 
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inductively entailed by the premises; (3) the reasoning used to infer the conclusion 
from the premises is based on the underlying assumption that the regularities 
described in the premises will persist; and (4) the inference is either that unexamined 
cases will resemble examined ones or that evidence makes an explanatory hypothesis 
probable.  When using induction scholars can make generalizations about the world.  
These inductive generalizations should be questioned on a few different levels.  First, 
is sample representative of the population?  Second, is the sample size large enough?  
And third, is the sample biased?  These questions can help guide us in determining 
the cogency of an argument that relies on inductive generalizations as its conclusions.  
One problem encountered when using induction is the problem of causation.  
Distinguishing between correlation and cause can be a severe problem for 
constructing coherent and cogent inductive arguments.  For example, Bush argues in 
his September 20, 2001 speech that the terrorists were motivated to attack the U.S. 
because they hate our freedoms.  While this may seem like a reasonable argument, it 
is flawed.  We do have a lot of freedom in America but there is only a correlation 
between this reality and the attacks.  Even though both exist, freedom and the attacks, 
there is no direct causal evidence in Bush’s reasoning.  There is only a correlation 
between the premise and conclusion.  Correlations can seem like cause if they are 
strong.  A strong correlation is one that allows the critic to make a probable assertion.  
We might argue that the example of the rising sun is strong correlation while Bush’s 
argument is weak correlation.  Not knowing the difference between cause and 
correlation invites fallacies in rhetor’s arguments.  The most common fallacies are 
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post hoc, begging the question, slippery slope, confusing correlation with cause, and 
objectionable cause.  Knowing the difference between a strong and a weak argument 
is crucial if we are going to analyze and construct them. 
 Nonetheless, an argument may be formally valid and correspond to reality but 
still not be strong if it cannot withstand critical questioning.  Building upon Plato, 
Johnson (2000) envisions argumentation as dialectical at its very core.  Premises are 
offered and must then undergo a method of critical questioning.  For Johnson (2000) 
form follows function.  We have to understand how it functions as persuasion of the 
Other.  Arguments are teleological.  They have a directed purpose of persuading the 
Other to the truth of a thesis.  This is done through the process of reasoning which 
leads a person “rationally to accept the claim in question” (Johnson, 2000, p. 149).  
Claims and premises are what Johnson calls the illative core of argument.  By moving 
away from syllogistic structure, Johnson (2000) cautions us about accepting structure 
as validity.  While structure is important, it should not be the defining characteristic 
of good argument.  Johnson adds to his theory of argument an additional step: the 
dialectical tier.  An argument may be formally valid and have true premises but still 
be weak if it cannot withstand critical questioning.  For Johnson (2000) the dialectic 
is more than just questioning.  He conceives of arguers as having dialectical 
obligations which force them to foreground their rebuttal arguments within their 
initial arguments.  He calls this process the dialectical tier.  He argues that the first 
level of the tier, the “illative core”, follows the claims-reasons structure.  Within this 
structure, each premise must have reasons or evidence to support the “target 
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proposition, which is the conclusion” (160).  In the second tier, Johnson (2000) 
argues that while the structure of the argument may be correct it does not mean that 
there will be persuasion of the Other.  If persuasion is to be rational then Others will 
formulate “standard objections” to arguments.  To persuade the Other, the arguer “is 
obliged to take account of these objections and opposing viewpoints” (p. 160).  
However, “if the arguer fails to deal with well known objections, this is a serious 
lapse” (p. 164) because according to Johnson the rhetor has failed to make an 
argument.  In other words, if the arguer does not speak to obvious objections then it is 
likely that she will fail in her attempt to persuade the Other.  
 Johnson has been criticized by theorists (Govier, 1998; Leff, 2000; Tindale, 
2002; van Rees, 2001) for having an overly restrictive definition of argument.  
Hansen argues that Johnson reliance on manifest rationality is overly restrictive.  
Hansen (2002) argues that there are plenty of arguments which do not have the 
dialectical tier nor are they entirely rational.  Rees also agrees with Hansen that 
argument need not have a dialectical tier in order to be thought of as argument.  
Furthermore, Hansen (2002) argues that Johnson’s theory of argument lacks a 
rhetorical dimension which is necessary to understand how rhetors use argument to 
persuade.  Each of these criticisms is legitimate.  For the purpose of this thesis, I will 
agree with Johnson’s structure of argument, including the dialectical tier.  However, I 
will argue that the dialectical tier is simply an additional reason or persuasive 
technique.  In other words, the dialectical tier is not definitive of argument, but is 
useful in talking about the persuasive and rhetorical dimension of argumentation.  
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 Narrative arguments should also be tested against reality.  Rowland (1987, 
1988) and Warnick (1987) recognize that narratives never arise in a vacuum and that 
we must consider factors outside the quality of the narrative’s construction to 
determine its fidelity.   When narrative functions as argument “it is constrained not 
just by standards of coherence and probability, but by the world itself” (Rowland, 
1987, p. 270); hence the strength of a story can be based on various factors outside of 
the internal consistency of the narrative: “If narrative fidelity and probability are to be 
useful tests of public argument, they must test not merely the story, but the story in 
relation to the world” (Rowland, 1987, p. 270).  These tests are important for a theory 
of counternarrative.  Understanding the structure of argument opens up the space for 
deconstructing an argument’s truth-value and its form.  Recognizing the importance 
of comparing narratives to reality allows the critic to analyze how culture and context 
play an important role in determining how narratives and counternarratives function.  
Lastly, analyzing the counterarguments, which exist for any premise-conclusion 
complex, and then testing them as valid can show the places where persuasion fails.  
In certain cases, audiences may infer or imply the conclusion from the premises that 
are given.  However, a skilled arguer will attack an argument at the level of 
assumption, implication, and inference.  Furthermore, they will question the use of 
evidence and reasoning in the construction of a conclusion.  The same process is true 
for counternarrative.  For counternarrative to engender adherence it attacks the weak 
points of a narrative.  Those weak points are the assumptions made by the initial 
arguer in developing his premise-conclusion complex or it is the reasons and evidence 
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given to support a premise.  Either way dialectical reasoning is important to this 
process because it questions narratives using rational argument testing or the 
dialectical tier, which can explain how narrative persuasive strategies function.  
Simply, to understand and refute narrative persuasion the counternarrative must use 
all available evidence to predict and refute the official narrative’s standard objections 
that will be brought against the message.  Using this design, we can understand how 
official narratives fade away or stay entrenched.  By testing the acceptability, 
relevancy, grounds, and dialectical composition of counternarrative critics will be 
able to predict and explain which counternarratives will be successful. 
Conclusion 
 This chapter made three main arguments: (a) while counternarratives share 
many of the same qualities as narrative they are distinct because they are in direct 
response to a particular official narrative; (b) counternarratives function to open space 
for alternative stories that have been marginalized in the construction of 
hegemonic/official narratives; and (c) even though Fisher’s narrative rationality has 
its problems, narrative fidelity and probability along with rational argument testing 
can be used to evaluate the narrative-counternarrative dialectic.  It is my contention 
that by testing the arguments, characters, and other aspects of the counternarrative we 
can assess why certain narratives engender adherence.  Moreover, we can also see 
how a particular narrative which seems like truth can be displaced in a world of 
competing narratives.  Importantly, narratives always compete for adherence but only 
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in the case of the counternarrative is there a direct tradeoff, where the more you 
believe one the less you believe the other.  It is this process that no rhetorical scholars 
have written about and to which this thesis is devoted. 
In chapter three I will examine the construction of the Bush official narrative ranging 
from 9/11 to the invasion in Iraq.  I will show how this particular narrative became 
the prevailing truth and the strategies used to undermine counternarrative 
construction.   
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Chapter 3: The Official Bush Narrative 
 The official narrative detailing our nation’s attitude and response to 9/11 was 
compiled through a number of presidential public addresses creating a narrative 
reinforcing American values of freedom, democracy, and justice.  This chapter will 
unpack the construction and functions of the Bush narrative from 9/11 to his October 
7, 2002 speech.  Since it is not possible to talk about every piece of presidential 
rhetoric, I will analyze five presidential speeches: Bush’s September 20, 2001 
Address to the Nation, January 29, 2002 State of the Union, June 1, 2002 The West 
Point Graduation Speech,  the September 12, 2002 Remarks to the UN, and the  
October 7,  2002 Iraq Threat Speech.  I chose these speeches for two reasons.  First, 
they are representative of the discourse which engendered the official narrative.  
Second, they are chronologically the five speeches that constructed the narrative from 
9/11 to Bush’s first declaration to use force in Iraq.  Bush achieved control over the 
rhetorical environment by capitalizing on a rhetorical vacuum left by the tragedy of 
9/11.  In the place of tolerance and debate Bush created an environment that 
discouraged deliberation and dissent through the use of epideictic rhetoric.  This 
chapter explains the form and function of Bush’s post 9/11 rhetoric, and specifically 
how Bush created a rhetorical environment that discouraged deliberation and dissent.     
The Form of Bush’s Post 9/11 Rhetoric 
I will analyze Bush’s post 9/11 rhetoric as war rhetoric because these speeches form a 
rhetorical trajectory that justifies the intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq.  The five 
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characteristics of presidential war rhetoric as developed by Campbell and Jameson 
(1990) are:  
(1) every element in it proclaims that the momentous decision to resort to 
force is deliberate, the product of  thoughtful consideration; (2) forceful 
intervention is justified through a chronicle or narrative from which 
argumentative claims are drawn; (3) the audience is exhorted to unanimity of 
purpose and total commitment; (4) the rhetoric not only justifies the use of 
force but also seeks to legitimate presidential assumption of the extraordinary 
powers of the commander in chief; and as a function of these other 
characteristics (5) strategic misrepresentations play an unusually significant 
role in its appeals. (105) 
Silberstein (2002) has noted that “war rhetoric, after all, dominated the White House 
communication after September 11” (p. 11) and continues to this day.  Two things 
have become obvious since 9/11.  First, the problem of 9/11 and terrorism was, and 
continues to be, a rhetorical problem; and second the president’s war rhetoric was 
designed to unify the nation and justify future interventions.  Bush’s post 9/11 
rhetoric should be analyzed from a narrative perspective because it is narrative.  
Therefore, in each subsection I will discuss elements of the narrative paradigm such 
as protagonists, plots, and the chronological order of events.  I will break the narrative 
up into the five main themes of war rhetoric: narrative, unification, justification of 
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intervention and expansion of governmental powers, strategic misrepresentation, and 
thoughtful consideration.   
Justified Through Narrative 
 Nine days after September 11 Bush begins his narrative.  During the 
September 20, 2001 Address to the Nation Bush spoke to a joint session of congress 
and the nation.  It was his first speech to the nation following 9/11, and in it he 
attempted to manage several rhetorical exigencies.  Who committed these acts of 
terrorism?  What is being done by the government?  When will this all be over?  And 
possibly the most important question why?  Bush framed his answers in narrative 
form.  He begins this speech with “In a normal course of events” (Bush, 2001), which 
begins the narrative arc.  After exalting the courage of the rescuers and the passengers 
of United flight 93 he particularizes the chronological aspect of the narrative by 
stating: “for the last nine days the world has seen the state of our union and it is 
strong” (Bush, 2001).  Bush takes a step back and marks the beginning of this 
narrative as September 11: “On September 11th enemies of freedom committed an act 
of war against our country” (Bush, 2001). This allows Bush to construct a temporal 
break with the past, move into the present, and construct an image of the future.  He 
then builds on the date by demarcating definitive lines of good and evil arguing this is 
just the beginning: “if an emboldened regime were to supply these weapons to 
terrorist allies, then the attacks of September the 11th would be a prelude to far 
greater horrors” (Bush, 2002d).  Bush’s strategy is to control the framing and 
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understanding of the past and future events.  A significant part of controlling the 
future through narrative is constructing worthy enemies.   
 Narratives always have characters, plots, and action.  For Bush the characters 
are easy to identify.  Bush elevates himself and his administration to hero status given 
the mission to obliterate the evil that wants to destroy our way of life.  Bush 
constructs the evil as terrorism and specifically Al Qaeda.  He argues that they are 
evil in every respect and to prove this point Bush invokes American’s desire to 
protect women and children by stating, “Targeting innocent civilians for murder is 
always and everywhere wrong.  Brutality against women is always and everywhere 
wrong.  There can be no neutrality between justice and cruelty, between the innocent 
and the guilty.  We are in a conflict between good and evil, and America will call evil 
by its name.  By confronting evil and lawless regimes, we do not create a problem, 
we reveal a problem.  And we will lead the world in opposing it” (Bush, 2001).  Bush 
rhetorically constructs “we” as the heroes and saviors in this epic battle against evil, 
portraying us as pure and our cause as just: “We fight, as we always fight, for a just 
peace -- a peace that favors human liberty.  We will defend the peace against threats 
from terrorists and tyrants” (Bush, 2002b).  Once Bush develops the enemy as he 
does throughout the speeches from 2001-2003 he completes the enthymeme by 
arguing that intervention and sacrifice are necessary.  Because only through 
sacrificing life and liberty will we return to peace.  In many of his speeches, he 
reminds us that we have an historic opportunity to preserve peace.  We have our best 
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chance since the rise of the nation state in the seventeenth century to build a world 
where the great powers compete in peace instead of prepare for war (Bush, 2002b).  
 The narrative is consistent and simple throughout all of Bush’s rhetoric.  
There is evil out there and it must be defeated, we are the ones to do it no matter the 
costs, and if we do not fight, they will destroy us.  Within this narrative, the evil 
begins as Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and Osama Bin Laden but as Bush switches focus, 
the evil changes to Iraq and Saddam.  Over this time, Bush’s rhetoric has all 
components of war rhetoric.  However, most important in his narrative is the way it 
crushes dissent and deliberation.  Bush’s rhetoric elevates the level of fear and 
nationalism to create a unified citizenry for that war and against dissent.  From 2001 
to 2003 the Bush administration got every piece of legislation they wanted, almost 
without any dissent (Kwaitaowski, 2007).  Bush was careful to construct the official 
narrative as one that placed Americans on the side of justice and liberty.  
Unification 
 Bush’s post-9/11 rhetoric to unify the nation constructed enemies and 
reestablished national identity.  I will focus on three specific unification strategies of 
Bush’s post 9/11 rhetoric.  First, I will unpack Bush’s use of demonizing rhetoric as a 
means to unify the polis and silence dissent.  Second, I will look at the use of guilt 
appeals as a strategy of unification.  Finally, I will analyze Bush’s use of “we” and 
how he constructs an American identity in the wake of 9/11. 
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 As Bush builds his case against Al Qaeda and later against Iraq, Bush relies 
on evil as the defining characteristic of the enemy that he uses to unify the nation and 
create a Manichean policy perspective.  During the September 20, 2001 speech Bush 
resolves who attacked us by stating, “The evidence we have gathered all points to a 
collection of loosely affiliated terrorist organizations known as al Qaeda” (Bush, 
2001).  After identifying the enemy he immediately begins to construct the enemy 
through such terms as “murderers,” “extremists,” “evil,” “destructive,” “fascism,” 
“Nazism,” and “totalitarianism.”  Each word functions as a condensation point 
allowing the audience to draw upon cultural references to create an image of the 
enemy as irredeemable.  Bush (2001) stated that the Al Qaeda terrorists were 
“enemies of freedom” and that “the civilized world is rallying to America's side” 
demarcating the lines between those who want freedom and civilization and the 
terrorists.  Bush further depicts the enemy by describing them as “a fringe form of 
Islamic extremism …a fringe movement that perverts the peaceful teachings of 
Islam…the terrorists’ directive commands them to kill Christian and Jews, to kill all 
Americans, and make no distinction between military and civilian, including women 
and children” (Bush, 2001).  This is in stark contrast to how Americans view 
themselves as pure and righteous.  The terrorists are irredeemable and evil; therefore, 
we “should be assured in our righteousness of our cause” (Bush, 2001).  Demonizing 
and unifying at the same time, Bush pushes this further by forcing the world to 
choose sides: “Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make.  Either you 
are with us, or you are with the terrorists” (Bush, 2001).  Bush constructs the 
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narrative as one above deliberation and focused on decision by focusing on its 
temporality, the now.  The audience must decide tonight whose side it is on--the 
righteous or the evil.  There are no grey areas and his government has already chosen 
its side.  By creating a sense of rhetorical urgency, Bush asked for immediate 
allegiance for his interpretation of events.  Demonizing rhetoric is nothing new in 
presidential war rhetoric.  Bush uses this address to construct the enemy and to 
heighten his campaign to unify the nation by discouraging dissent (Silberstein, 
2002).The use of enemy imagery to construct the terrorist, unify the nation, and 
promote democracy and freedom is a clear goal of Bush’s post 9/11 rhetoric.  
 Demonizing the Other is not the only function of Bush’s rhetoric of evil.  
Bush also uses the rhetoric of evil to implicate the American conscience.  During the 
January 20th address Bush tells us: 
None of us would ever wish the evil that was done on September the 
11th…For too long our culture has said, ‘If it feels good, do it.’ Now America 
is embracing a new ethic and a new creed: ‘Let's roll.’ In the sacrifice of 
soldiers…firefighters, and… ordinary citizens, we have glimpsed what a new 
culture of responsibility could look like. We want to be a nation that serves 
goals larger than self. We've been offered a unique opportunity, and we must 
not let this moment pass.  (Bush, 2002a) 
Bush describes the time before 9/11 as a time when Americans were greedy and 
morally corrupt.  By indicting the American character and associating it with the 
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terrorist attacks, Bush pursued the American electorate’s guilty conscience (Semmler, 
2003).  Guilt is a powerful motivating force.  When we feel guilty we are less likely 
to question motives or the cogency of an argument.  Instead, we desire to remove the 
guilt (Aronson & Pratkanis, 1991).  In this case to rid ourselves of the guilt we 
embrace the narrative by becoming model citizens trusting in our leadership and 
supporting its decisions without question.  Bush returns to a sense of urgency and 
crisis.  This time there is an urgency to save the national character.  He tells us that 
we are in a unique time one that must be seized immediately.   
 In the wake of 9/11 Bush reestablishes a threatened American identity in two 
distinct ways.  First Bush accentuates the usage of “we”, “us”, and “our” in his 
rhetoric.  Throughout his speeches he continually uses these terms to describe how 
the nation should be feeling, understanding and acting.  Bush’s use of “we”, “us”, and 
“our” in Bush’s post 9/11 rhetoric functions to unify the nation around a particular 
national identity.  In constructing the American “we” he simultaneously constructs his 
ideal audience.  Burke (1969) reminds us that identification means that the audience 
and the rhetor become “substantially one” (p. 21).  Murphy (2003) explains: “if 
discourse enters into identity, then the audience is a rhetorical effect.  Who we are as 
a collective evolves from the discourses we commonly experience” (pp. 621-22).  
How Bush deploys the use of “we”, “us” and “our” as defining what it means to be 
American is part of constructing an audience, models for action, and a unified public.  
Bush begins the 20 September address by giving us a model of how Americans act 
during a time of crisis by stating: “we have seen it in the courage of passengers, who 
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rushed terrorists to save others on the ground…We have seen the state of our Union 
in the endurance of rescuers, working past exhaustion.  We have seen the unfurling of 
flags, the lighting of candles, the giving of blood, the saying of prayer” (Bush, 2001).  
He invokes the image of the rescue workers and the passengers of United 93 to create 
a condensation symbol.  These images become reference points imbued with the 
qualities of the ideal American.  Not all Americans are able to fight or rescue but all 
of us are capable of prayer, flag waving, and giving blood.  Bush then moves to 
define Americans through their values: “we are in a fight for our principles, and our 
first responsibility is to live by them” (Bush, 2001).  We are a country defined by our 
principles and values of “justice”, “freedom”, and “democracy”.  Bush continues: 
Great harm has been done to us. We have suffered great loss. And in our grief 
and anger we have found our mission and our moment. Freedom and fear are 
at war. The advance of human freedom – the great achievement of our time, 
and the great hope of every time – now depends on us. Our nation – this 
generation – will lift a dark threat of violence from our people and our future. 
We will rally the world to this cause by our efforts, by our courage. We will 
not tire, we will not falter, and we will not fail. (Bush, 2001)  
Since “we” are defined by our principles, “we” should defend those principles.  It 
should not be underestimated how the language of “we” functions to create an “us” 
against “them” mentality that reinforces Bush use of enemy imagery and the process 
of unification. By defining “we “ as a core values.  Bush elevates unification and 
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conformity to the status of universal.  To not follow the value of “we” would place 
someone on the margins as unpatriotic.  This functionally privileges conformity over 
dissent and silence over deliberation.   
 Second Bush used synecdoche to become the voice of Americans; he outlined 
how we should feel and react to the events of 9/11.  Murphy (2003) argues that 
through Bush’s use of synecdoche “the president established a synecdochal 
relationship with the people. He represented our experiences, feelings, and actions 
and spoke of those actions in our voice…He took full advantage of the ‘huge political 
opportunity’ offered by the 9/11 attacks by becoming the one voice of the nation” (p. 
622).  Bush became the model of a nation in crisis elevating his goals and actions as 
the goals and actions of the each individual American. As a model of action he tells 
us “I will not forget this wound to our country or those who inflicted it. I will not 
yield; I will not rest; I will not relent in waging this struggle for freedom and security 
for the American people” (Bush, 2001).  Moreover, Bush concludes neither should 
we.  In essence, Bush does the deciding so that we do not have to.  
Justifying Intervention and the Expansion of Governmental Powers 
 Bush justifies intervention into Iraq and Afghanistan by linking it to the fight 
for American values and security.  The Uniting and Strengthening America by 
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 
2001, or the PATRIOT Act for short, has been the Bush administration’s answer to 
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domestic terrorism.  Bush’s rhetoric became the impetus for the passage of the Bush 
doctrine and the USA PATRIOT act. 
 During the September 20, 2001, speech after Bush answered the question of 
who bombed the World Trade Center it was important for Bush to explain why.  In 
one of the most memorable parts of this speech, Bush asks and answers the question 
in this way: 
Americans are asking why they hate us?  They hate what we see right here in 
this chamber—a democratically elected government—their leaders are self 
appointed.  They hate our freedoms—our freedom of religion, our freedom of 
speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other.  
(Bush, 2001)   
Bush’s statements are meant to remind us that the American way of life must be 
defended.  In this respect these propositions can be read in two different ways: (a) our 
way of life is great and sometimes we are called on to fight to defend it; and (b) that 
our way of life is so great that others are jealous and have decided that we need to be 
fought because our existence is a threat to their way of life.  Bush uses both 
interpretations during the speech.  In one part of the speech Bush reminds us that 
“with every atrocity, they hope America grows fearful, retreating from the world and 
forsaking our friends. They stand against us because we stand in their way” (Bush, 
2001).  This builds upon the latter interpretation by reminding us that the world is 
envious of our lifestyle and these particular people are so jealous that they want to 
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remove us.  The former interpretation can be seen in this passage: “Tonight we are a 
country awakened to danger and called to defend freedom.  Our grief has turned to 
anger, and anger to resolution. Whether we bring our enemies to justice or justice to 
our enemies, justice will be done” (Bush, 2001).  The purpose of this passage is 
evident.  Bush taps into the values of justice and freedom as worth fighting for and a 
means to embolden the electorate.  During his commencement address at West Point, 
he explains, “We fight, as we always fight, for a just peace -- a peace that favors 
human liberty” (2002b).  Bush uses the recurring themes of justice and liberty as 
means to link to the purity of American purpose.  This purity of purpose is linked, in 
a deliberative way, to the use of force to bring justice to our enemies even if that 
means preemptively.     
 Bush uses the platform of 9/11 to initiate a new foreign policy, known as the 
Bush Doctrine or the doctrine of preemption, which allows his government to expand 
the war on terror.  Lieber and Lieber (2002) highlight the four main tenants of the 
Bush Doctrine: (1) it calls for the preemptive military action against hostile states and 
terrorist groups seeking to develop weapons of mass destruction; (2) the U.S. will not 
allow our military strength to be challenged by any foreign competitors; (3) the U.S. 
will act unilaterally if the need arises; (4) it is the new mission of the U.S. to spread 
democracy, especially in the Muslim world.  While the Bush Doctrine was not 
unveiled until September 2002, Bush prepared the nation for months prior through the 
use of public address.  Bush never mentions the Bush Doctrine by its official name, 
The National Security Strategy, but he makes multiple references to how U.S. 
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strategy has changed in the wake of 9/11.  He argues in the January 29, 2002 State of 
the Union that America has two goals.  First, Bush states, “These enemies view the 
entire world as a battlefield, and we must pursue them wherever they are” (Bush, 
2002a).  The implication is clear that the U.S. will invade any country that it deems as 
terrorist and then he follows with “some governments will be timid in the face of 
terror.  And make no mistake about it.  If they do not act, America will” (Bush, 
2002a).  Even though Bush highlights North Korea and Iran, he spends most of his 
time on Iraq.  Bush tells us “Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward America and 
to support terror” (Bush, 2002a).  He then pushes the audience to pick a side.  Thus in 
one rhetorical motion Bush expands the war on terror to nation states which his 
administration deems a threat most notably Iraq.  The second objective, which Bush 
outlines in this speech, is “to prevent regimes that sponsor terror from threatening 
America or our friends and allies with weapons of mass destruction” (Bush, 2002a).  
At this point Bush begins to push aggressively and names the Axis of Evil: Iran, 
North Korea, and Iraq.  In his June 1 commencement speech at West Point Bush 
states: “our security will require all Americans to be forward-looking and resolute, to 
be ready for preemptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend 
our lives” (2002b).  Statements such as this were expanded upon to become The 
National Security Strategy of the United States or the Bush Doctrine as it has been 
called.    
 The Bush Doctrine is significant because it allows for multiple interventions 
and it crushes dissent.  The Bush doctrine is “manifesto” which calls for U.S. 
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intervention “war whenever and wherever an American president chooses” (Gitlin, 
2003).  Another effect of the Bush Doctrine, like the USA PATRIOT Act, is to quell 
internal dissent from Congress and the public: “when our nation conducts its business 
abroad this way…Democrats and Republicans alike… become …patriotic.  They do 
not condemn or ridicule, or demand reform and restitution. They go along with it, 
perhaps believing the endlessly charming stories told by…the White House” 
(Kwiatkowski, 2007, p. 3).  There is a belief among Americans that when the country 
is at war it becomes incumbent for its citizens to support the war.  Fear of anti-
patriotic stigma guides many Americans to accept wars even if they disagree with the 
justifications (Gitlin, 2003).  Unfortunately, there is more at work here than mere 
stigmatization.  In the rhetorical environment post-9/11 speaking out against 
government policies also carried the risk of state sanctioned surveillance and/or 
imprisonment via the USA PATRIOT Act. 
 The USA PATRIOT Act’s goal is to enhance national security by increasing 
funding for the F.B.I., inter-agency information sharing, increased surveillance 
(particularly of Internet resources), and lowering the requirements for a search 
warrant.  As with the Bush Doctrine, the President never mentions the USA 
PATRIOT Act directly during any of his speeches.  In fact, the only time Bush ever 
mentions the USA PATRIOT Act by name is during the official signing, which 
happened on October 26, 2001.  Even though he never mentions the Act by name 
there are allusions to it dating back to the September 20, 2001 State of the Union.  
 64 
 
 During the September 20, 2001 State of the Union, Bush makes two important 
allusions to the PATRIOT Act.  First Bush justifies the creation of the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) and the expansion of presidential powers by stating, 
“Today, dozens of federal departments and agencies, as well as state and local 
governments, have responsibilities affecting homeland security. These efforts must be 
coordinated at the highest level. So tonight I announce the creation of a Cabinet-level 
position reporting directly to me -- the Office of Homeland Security” (Bush, 2001).  
Part of homeland security has been the passage of the PATRIOT Act.  The USA 
PATRIOT act makes the DHS viable insofar as it grants it the power to function by 
expanding the government’s jurisdiction in matters of terrorism to the U.S. proper.  
Bush’s second allusion to the USA PATRIOT Act comes when he remarks “We will 
come together to give law enforcement the additional tools it needs to track down 
terror here at home.  We will come together to strengthen our intelligence capabilities 
to know the plans of terrorists before they act, and find them before they strike” 
(Bush, 2001).  Both of these comments are clear allusions to the USA PATRIOT Act 
because they are in the same language that he uses at the signing of the USA 
PATRIOT Act. Bush remarks, “It [The USA PATRIOT Act] will help law 
enforcement to identify, to dismantle, to disrupt, and to punish terrorists before they 
strike” (Bush, 2002b).  He never explains what it means to “give law enforcement the 
additional tools it needs” or what coordinating agencies might entail.  Since its 
passage the USA PATRIOT Act has been debated widely by its proponents and 
critics for its effects on security and civil liberties. 
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  The PATRIOT Act influenced the rhetorical environment by expanding 
presidential powers and potentially limiting dissent.  Nancy Chang (2002) states: “A 
number of the USA PATRIOT Acts provisions are uncontroversial.  The act 
nevertheless stands out as radical in the degree to which it…consolidates new powers 
in the executive branch” (p. 43).  Many of the provisions in the USA PATRIOT act 
are meant to give the government broad authority to combat terrorism.  However, the 
definition of terrorist has been expanded to include domestic terrorism but it has been 
argued that it is overly broad Chang (2002) continues: “the act places our First 
Amendment rights to freedom of speech and political association in jeopardy by 
creating a broad new crime of domestic terrorism and denying entry to noncitizens on 
the basis of ideology” ( p .44).  Under Section 501 any American citizen who is 
exercising their freedom of speech and right to assembly can be “picked off the 
streets or from home and taken to a secret military tribunal with no access to or 
notification of a lawyer, the press, or family” (Morales, 2003, n.p.).  Imbuing the 
government with these broad sweeping powers to prosecute and imprison citizens has 
the potential to undermine grassroots participation.  The indirect effect of legislation 
such as the USA PATRIOT Act creates a rhetorical environment where dissidents 
refuse to speak out in fear of prosecution or stigmatization.   
 On the other hand proponents of the PATRIOT act argue that its importance 
in combating the threat of terrorism.  They also claim us that the act has never been 
abused. In arguing for the USA PATRIOT act Paul Rosenzweig (2004) states, “most 
of the tales of abuse and misuse are based on mistaken information” (“Ashcroft 
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legacy”).  He and others (Meese & Carafano, 2004) argue that while the potential for 
abuse exists there has been no substantial abuse of the act’s powers to this point.  
They also argue there are inherent safeguards in the UAS PATRIOT act that would 
preclude its misuse: “the power of oversight gives Americans freedom—freedom to 
grant the government powers, like those found in the PATRIOT act, when the need 
arises, secure in the knowledge that they can restrain the exercise of those powers 
appropriately” (Meese, 2004).  The point is that Bush’s post 9/11 rhetoric expanded 
the government’s authority.  The debate on the value of the PATRIOT act has yet to 
be decided, but what is clear is that it is the result of the president’s war rhetoric. 
Strategic Misrepresentation 
 Campbell and Jamieson argue that strategic misrepresentation has two 
important characteristics: “it stifles dissents and unifies the nation for immediate and 
sustained action” (1990, p. 119).  Bush’s war rhetoric has stifled dissent and 
discussion at every step of the process.  I argue that Bush used strategic 
misrepresentation in disclosing the facts and constructing the narrative, which pushed 
us to war with Iraq.  Presidents have access to more information than anyone in the 
Congress or the electorate.  Thus they are able to decide which facts are given to the 
public and which facts are held back. It is not uncommon for presidents to abuse this 
power.  From John Adams starting a war with France to James Polk provoking war 
with Mexico to acquire their land, presidents have misrepresented facts to drive the 
country to war for over two hundred years (Campbell & Jamieson, 1990).  So it 
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comes as no surprise that Bush did the same thing in relation to Iraq.  The Bush 
administration misrepresented many facts on the road to war with Iraq but this section 
will deal with only two: (a) Iraq was linked to Al-Qaeda and (b) Iraq had weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD).   
 Four days after 9/11 President Bush met with his senior policy advisors at 
Camp David to discuss our response to 9/11.  During this meeting, there were 
“leading hawks aggressively pressing the president to go to war with Iraq, whether or 
not it was linked to 9/11” (Chaudhry, Scheer, & Scheer, 2003, p. 16).  This is 
important because even though Bush did not mention attacking Iraq in the September 
20, 2001 speech, he picked up the cause soon after.  By signing the Bush doctrine into 
law he set the stage for a preemptive strike on Iraq.  The only thing left to do was to 
justify it to the public.  Starting with his January 29, 2002 address Bush begins 
constructing the rhetorical environment that made the attack on Iraq inevitable.  
 Bush begins the narrative by advancing the role Iraq plays in harboring 
terrorists and developing weapons of mass destruction which are fully capable of 
threatening the United States: 
The Iraqi regime has plotted to develop anthrax, and nerve gas, and nuclear 
weapons for over a decade. . . States like these, and their terrorist allies, 
constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By 
seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing 
danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to 
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match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the 
United States.  In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be 
catastrophic.  (Bush, 2002a)   
In this speech, Bush begins to link Iraq to terrorism.  In fact, Bush is using Iraq as the 
representation of state sponsored terrorism along with North Korea and Iran.  For 
Bush this lays the groundwork that he will use in the future to rhetorically construct 
Iraq as a terrorist state.   
 Between January and September, Bush does not mention Iraq in his major 
public addresses.  Nevertheless, in that time he does make his case for unilateral 
military preemption in his speech at West Point.  Moreover, his administration spends 
the summer outlining the Iraq threat.  Therefore, on September 12, 2002 Bush goes to 
the United Nations and asks for their approval to invade Iraq.  Bush’s Remarks to the 
U.N. constructed Iraq as the main threat to international stability.  He argues, “Iraq 
continues to shelter and support terrorist organizations that direct violence against 
Iran, Israel, and Western governments” (Bush, 2002c).  He then changes the 
perspective of the speech by speaking directly to Saddam and issues five demands: 
(a) destroy all WMD; (b) stop supporting terrorism; (c) stop persecuting minorities 
including the Shiite, Sunni, women, and Kurds; (d) account for all Gulf War 
personnel; and (e) stop breaking the U.N. oil for food embargo.  It is from this 
platform that Bush argues in the October 7, 2002 speech that Iraq and Al Qaeda are 
partners in their war against America.  Bush states “Alliance with terrorists could 
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allow the Iraqi regime to attack America without leaving any fingerprints” (Bush, 
2002d).  Bush further argues:  
we know that Iraq and the al Qaeda terrorist network share a common enemy -
- the United States of America. We know that Iraq and al Qaeda have had 
high-level contacts that go back a decade. Some al Qaeda leaders who fled 
Afghanistan went to Iraq. These include one very senior al Qaeda leader who 
received medical treatment in Baghdad this year, and who has been associated 
with planning for chemical and biological attacks. We've learned that Iraq has 
trained al Qaeda members in bomb-making and poisons and deadly gases.  
(Bush, 2002d)    
All of these statements construct Iraq as a threat to America through their ties with Al 
Qaeda.  This allows Bush to move to his second argument against Iraq—possession 
of WMD. The entire 7 October speech, where Bush outlines the Iraq threat to 
America, is about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction and their ties to terror.  Bush 
explains, “the Iraqi regime… possesses and produces chemical and biological 
weapons” and they are “seeking nuclear weapons” (Bush, 2002d).  Bush’s rhetorical 
strategies inflate the importance of Iraq by making them a threat to America and the 
entire world.  His justifications for this conclusion were all built upon strategic 
misrepresentation.  Bush manipulated the intelligence data “based on a political 
agenda rather than the facts at hand” (Chaudhry, Scheer, &Scheer, 2003, p. 17).  By 
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selecting specific information Bush was able to tell the story he wanted.  This has 
always been the way the office of the president prepares a country for war.  
Thoughtful Consideration 
 Thoughtful consideration was not a large part of Bush’s public addresses.  In 
fact, in these speeches it is hard to find where Bush seems reflexive or thoughtful 
about the consequences of his leadership.  Bush repeatedly argues that we are “just” 
and “righteous” in our action which seems to indicate that our mission need not be 
debated. Between 2001 and 2003 Bush reinforces his Manichean view of the world as 
good vs. evil.   Never does he say we might be taking the wrong path, nor does he 
indicate that these are hard decisions.  Instead, Bush argues: “Events can turn in one 
of two ways: If we fail to act in the face of danger, the people of Iraq will continue to 
live in brutal submission.  The regime will have new power to bully and dominate and 
conquer its neighbors, condemning the Middle East to more years of bloodshed and 
fear. The regime will remain unstable -- the region will remain unstable, with little 
hope of freedom, and isolated from the progress of our times.  With every step the 
Iraqi regime takes toward gaining and deploying the most terrible weapons, our own 
options to confront that regime will narrow” (Bush, 2002c).  Bush seems content to 
believe that there is no need for consideration when it comes to war because there are 
no other choices.  When he argues that our option will narrow he is arguing that 
unless we fight now we will have to respond to the threat through the doctrine of 
deterrence by using our own weapons of mass destruction. From the point of view of 
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the administration and indeed Bush himself, war with Iraq was a forgone conclusion.  
The only consideration was who was going to help us.   
 We have seen how the Bush administration chose facts that inflated the case 
against Iraq.   In the process of proving Iraq was a threat they ignored or silenced 
anyone who disagreed.  When the Security Council vetoed an invasion of Iraq Bush 
warned the U.N. that their role in the world was becoming irrelevant, never wavering, 
or questioning his decision to disarm Iraq.  Bush pushed forward without thoughtful 
consideration.  
Conclusion 
 In the days following 9/11 until the next presidential election it was clear that 
Bush’s narrative was controlling the country.  This can be seen in his high approval 
ratings of 58% in January of 2003.  In fact, the same poll remarked that Bush got high 
marks for vision, leadership, and the ability to make hard decisions.  Moreover, it 
stated that “his handling of national defense wins approval from more than six in 10 
Americans” (Cnn.com, 2003). With such strong support from the electorate and the 
Congress B ush was able to capitalize on the passage of the Bush Doctrine and 
preemptively attack Iraq.  The Iraq war was the catalyst for the most spectacular 
dissent to the Bush narrative by Michael Moore in his documentary Fahrenheit 9/11.  
Chapter Four will examine how Fahrenheit 9/11 functioned as counternarrative and 
evaluate its probability, fidelity, and strength.   
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Chapter 4: Fahrenheit 9/11: A Case Study of  Counternarrative 
Immediately following 9/11, President Bush constructed a narrative 
environment which allowed him to invade Afghanistan and used the narrative to 
justify invading Iraq.  War rhetoric is defined by five functions: unification, narrative 
explanation of crisis, thoughtful consideration, expansion of presidential powers, and 
justification of intervention (Jamieson and Campbell, 1990).  As illustrated in the 
previous chapter, Bush’s rhetoric enacts this pattern through his public addresses 
from September 20, 2001 until October 7, 2002.  During this time, the Bush 
administration invaded Afghanistan, shut down dissent, and laid the rhetorical 
groundwork for the March 2003 invasion of Iraq.  Conceptualized as a response to 
such silencing rhetoric, Fahrenheit 9/11 develops several arguments to denounce 
Bush’s seemingly tightly crafted narrative.  Thus, Chapter Four will contrast this most 
visible moment of public dissent against the Bush narrative by analyzing the 
counternarrative of Fahrenheit 9/11.  I will analyze how counternarratives argue by 
investigating select strategies that Michael Moore uses to construct his 
counternarrative and determining their fidelity and probability.  
While Fahrenheit 9/11 makes many arguments there are three that are most 
responsive to the Bush narrative as outlined in Chapter Three. They are that 
corruption in the Bush administration undermined our response in the War on Terror, 
that Bush lied about the Iraq threat, and that every person can make a difference.  I 
will examine each of these themes and select strategies used to construct them 
argumentatively.  Once the strategies are laid out I will evaluate the probability and 
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fidelity of each theme.  In the conclusion, I will evaluate the fidelity and probability 
of the entire movie.  
Corruption, the War on Terror, and Narrative Inference 
Fahrenheit 9/11 weaves a portrait of Bush as a failure who has succeeded 
only because he is connected.  Moore tells two particular stories to counter Bush’s 
characterization of himself as America’s protector.  First Moore uses counternarrative 
to argue that the Bush administration’s connections to the Saudis undermined U.S. 
security.  Second Moore argues that Bush’s relationship to multinational corporations 
such as Enron, Unocal, and the Carlyle Group motivated Bush’s decision to invade 
Afghanistan and Iraq.  The collision of business interests with those of the everyman 
is a primary conflict in the movie.  First, I briefly overview Moore’s counternarrative 
as it relates to corruption.  I explain what narrative inference is and how it functions 
as a strategy.  Lastly, I analyze the probability and fidelity of this counternarrative 
strategy.  
Initially Moore openly accuses the President of attacking Saddam so that the 
United States did not have to invade Saudi Arabia.  To support this claim Moore 
focuses on the Saudi/Bush connection by asking a series of rhetorical questions:  
Let’s say one group of people, the American people, pay you $400,000 a year 
to be president of the United States and another group of people have invested 
in you, your friends and their related businesses $1.4 BILLION over a number 
of years who you gonna like?  Who’s your daddy?   Because that’s how much 
the Saudi Royals and their associates have given the Bush family, their 
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friends, and their related business in the past three decades. (Moore, 2004, p. 
36)   
Moore concludes by asking, “Is it rude to suggest that when the Bush family wakes 
up in the morning they might be thinking about what’s best for the Saudis instead of 
what’s best for you and me? Cause $1.4 billion doesn’t just buy a lot of flights out of 
the country it buys a lot of love” (Moore, 2004, p. 36).  Fahrenheit 9/11 builds upon 
this accusation by linking Bush to multinational corporations, in particular Enron, 
Unocal, and the Carlyle Group.  Moore’s argument against President Bush and his 
handling of the War on Terror is that Bush’s business connections to Saudis--and 
corporate America--have undermined an effective response to 9/11 and the welfare of 
the American public.  By making this argument, Moore seeks to undermine the 
official narrative’s probability and fidelity by attacking Bush’s ethics and hence his 
credibility.      
 As he constructs his counternarrative against Bush’s narrative Moore zeros in 
on the president’s business connections as evidence of the administration’s 
corruption.  The most pronounced argument for collusion begins in the segment of the 
film called “Going to war” where Moore interviews Richard Clarke.  Clarke tells us 
that the Bush administration always wanted to go to war with Iraq and never prepared 
at all for war with or in Afghanistan.  Moore moves from this interview into his role 
as narrator and asks, “Was the war in Afghanistan really about something else” 
(Moore, 2004, p. 28)?  For the next few minutes, Moore uses his role as narrator to 
link Bush to the Taliban, Enron, and the oil industry.  Moore explains that in 1997, 
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when Bush was governor of Texas, a Taliban envoy visited Houston to talk to Unocal 
about building a pipeline through Afghanistan to bring natural gas from central Asia.  
Moore insinuates that as soon as the war was over the first thing the new government 
did was sign a deal with neighboring countries agreeing to build a pipeline through 
Afghanistan.  After this deal was signed the first company to enter into a drilling 
contract in Afghanistan was Halliburton headed by Dick Cheney.  While this might 
seem coincidental Moore asserts that after the U.S. forces ousted the Taliban regime 
the U.S. government installed Afghanistan’s new president Hamid Karzai.  Moore 
(2004) asks, “Who was Hamid Karzai? He was a former advisor to Unocal.  Bush 
also appointed as our envoy to Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad, who was also a former 
Unocal advisor.”  In the same section, Moore argues that the Carlyle group made a 
tremendous profit from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan because they own the 11th 
largest defense contractor, United Defense.  He leads into this revelation by placing 
Bush on the board of one of the Carlyle Group’s other companies and then infers that 
his ties with the Carlyle Group have influenced his decision to go to war in 
Afghanistan and to expand that war into Iraq.   
 Moore wants the audience to conclude that Bush’s administration is corrupt 
because of its business connections, and this might seem like an acceptable premise 
as it reveals relevant information about the motivation of President Bush to expand 
the War on Terror.  In addition, Moore provides grounds for this premise by revealing 
that Carlyle’s one-day profits from their public offering of United Defense was 237 
million dollars (Moore, 2004, p. 37).  Fahrenheit 9/11 makes a concerted effort to 
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show that the Bush family has made a great deal of money from their connections to 
multinational corporations and the Saudi royal family.  In doing so Moore infers; he 
invites viewers to believe that Bush has allowed his business connections to dictate 
American foreign policy.  Even though Moore seems to advance a cogent argument, 
is it the best explanation for the U.S. going to war in Afghanistan and/or Iraq?  
Moore’s use of narrative inference 
Moore uses argument by inference as a main strategy to counter the Bush 
narrative and implicate the president in corruption.  Arguing by inference is an 
“argument in which a hypothesis is inferred from some data on the grounds that it 
offers the best available explanation of that data” (Govier, 2005, p. 353).  Evaluating 
argument by inference is critical to our ability to judge the fidelity and probability of 
many of Moore’s counternarrative arguments.  Govier (2005) offers two additional 
tests, beyond the ARG conditions, to assess an argument by inference.  To be 
accepted as the best explanation of the data an inference must be plausible and 
falsifiable. More specifically, it must be “consistent with relevant background 
knowledge” and open “to disconfirmation” (Govier, 2005, p. 353).  Argument by 
inference in Fahrenheit 9/11 is best examined by recognizing how Moore links Bush 
to a number of conspiracy theories.  Moore suggests that Bush has secret ties with the 
Saudis, the head of the Fox News division, the vote count lady in Florida, the Taliban, 
Enron, and the Carlyle Group.  Moore attributes Bush’s success in life and politics to 
his secret ties with corporations, dirty politicians, and extremely powerful money 
men.  Moore’s intention is to illustrate that these connections should make the 
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American public rethink their adherence to the Bush administration’s official story of 
9/11 since all of these entities have a vested interest in the decisions made after the 
bombing of the World Trade Center.   
To assess counternarrative fidelity and probability it will be important to 
assess the arguments made in this section of the movie for cogency.  Counternarrative 
fidelity is composed of the overlapping concepts of rational argument testing and the 
dialectical tier.  Critics can assess the strength of a counternarrative by evaluating the 
argument using tests of rational argument such as plausibility and falsifiability and by 
measuring this evaluation against how it is publicly evaluated by others.  
Testing narrative probability and fidelity 
Evaluating a narrative’s probability involves evaluating argument cogency.  
Part of testing probability is evaluating if the argument contains all relevant facts, pro 
and con, then after careful deliberation, a conclusion is drawn.  Ideally, this 
conclusion will be the most likely explanation for data.  Govier (2005) reminds us 
that testing inference is about testing what is the most likely explanation for any 
particular causal argument.  In every instance, when evaluating inference, the critic 
needs to ask if this is the best explanation.   
One of the most common attacks against Moore’s movie was that it was 
nothing more than conspiracy theory, which undermined the movie’s credibility.  
Attributing Moore’s argument to conspiracy effectively diminishes the truth-value of 
his argument.  For example, the treatment of the pipeline argument by popular media 
outlets has argued that it “twists and bends the available facts and makes glaring 
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omissions” (Isikoff, 2004, p. 29).  Isikoff & Hosenball (2004) also call it a 
“conspiratorial claim” (p. 1) and Hitchens (2004) calls it a “sinister exercise in moral 
frivolity” (p. 1).  Hitchens argues that there is not a pipeline under construction but a 
highway that stretches the length of Afghanistan from Kabul to Kandahar.  He goes 
on to say that “if we turn to the facts that are deliberately left out” (Hitchens, 2004, p. 
2) we will find a newly formed Afghan army, that Afghanistan is under the protection 
of the broadest military alliance in history, it has a new constitution and is about to 
hold a general election.  These arguments are counter both to Moore and Richard 
Clarke’s claim that the U.S. does not have enough troops in Afghanistan and hence 
the country remains unstable.  Even though the situation in Afghanistan has not been 
easy, what Hitchens observes is important.  Moore uses lack of U.S. troop strength in 
Afghanistan as support for his argument that Bush was not concerned with security.  
This was not the most likely or best explanation.  Instead, it is most likely that fewer 
troops were needed because NATO was involved with the occupation.  NATO’s 
involvement included troops from over 30 countries so not as many U.S. troops were 
needed (nato.int, June 28, 2004).  Juxtaposing the excluded facts with the ad 
hominem attack used by the popular media forces Fahrenheit 9/11 in a corner where 
Moore’s entire corruption argument becomes questionable as the best explanation for 
U.S. intentions in Afghanistan.  As each sub-argument becomes scrutinized in the 
dialectical process, the lack of substantive evidence for many of these claims 
becomes evident.  Thus, although Moore’s argument may seem plausible, it is not 
falsifiable and this creates two problems for Moore.  First he fails the basic criterion 
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for rational argument testing.  Second his critics easily exploit the lack of evidence.  
By not providing falsifiable arguments, Moore leaves his counternarrative open to 
attacks that he manipulated the available evidence and created propaganda rather than 
a legitimate argument deserving serious consideration.   
 Moore argues that Bush and his corporate connections gained from the 
invasion in Afghanistan and Iraq in two important ways.  First, the defense industry 
made a lot of money.  Second, the oil and gas industry stood to make a lot of money 
as well.  From these two premises Moore argues that it only stands to reason that 
Bush invaded the countries to help his friends.  While this may be plausible, Moore is 
woefully lacking on any falsifiable evidence, to prove these assertions.  It is true that 
the defense industry has made a lot of money since the war on terror began.  
However, it does not follow that we went to war to increase the profits of the defense 
industry.  What makes it tempting to use this line of thought is that it is tailor made 
for a movie.  In documentaries events are sequenced together to create a narrative and 
make an argument.  Because of the speed of a film, there is no time to reflect on the 
chain of reasoning and hence visual and auditory sequences often affirm facticity, 
even when there is none (Hitchens, 2004a; Mander, 1978).  Moore takes advantage of 
this when he makes the argument that money motivated Bush’s response to 9/11 and 
not American security.  By showing images of all the companies that stood to profit 
from 9/11 and then inferring that these companies had control over American foreign 
policy, Moore provides an explanation for why we invaded Iraq and Afghanistan.  
Unfortunately this explanation lacks solid reasoning or evidence and hence when 
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scrutinized lacks narrative probability.  Moore’s corruption argument may have been 
acceptable, relevant, and with grounds at first glance but was not able to stand up to 
close scrutiny.  Good arguments need to withstand the critical questioning inherent in 
the dialectic.    
 This analysis shows that the strength of a counternarrative depends on two 
factors: the merits of the argument and public discourse that analyzes these 
arguments.  Therefore, even if the Bush narrative was flawed it gains adherence 
because of its timeliness, its acceptance by the media over counternarratives, its 
plausibility, and its falsifiability.  Moore’s counternarrative, on the other hand, fails 
because the themes involve fundamental flaws in reasoning; this allows the media to 
review and discredit his counternarrative.   
Bush Lied about Iraqi  
 In Chapter Three I showed that Bush highlights two main arguments in favor 
of preemptive action: Iraq had weapons of mass destruction and Saddam Hussein had 
ties to Al Qaeda and 9/11.  Each of these arguments amplified the perceived threat 
Iraq posed to the U.S. and gave justification for intervention.  Throughout Fahrenheit 
9/11, Moore argues that Bush misled the American public about the threat Iraq posed.  
Moore uses archival footage as a main strategy in countering the administration’s 
narrative.  Specifically, he uses this footage to recreate and accentuate the 
administration’s role in creating Iraq as a threat to America and the world.  In fact, he 
uses archive clips of news sources to counter Bush’s narrative.  In this section, I will 
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analyze Moore’s use of archival footage to argue that Bush mislead the American 
electorate about the threat posed by Iraq. 
Moore’s Use of Archive Footage  
 The use of archive footage throughout Fahrenheit 9/11 is substantial.  Of the 
40 celebrities who appeared in the film, 37 of them are listed as archival footage 
(Kopel, 2004).  As the writer, director, and narrator of the story Moore is able to 
choose specific archive footage for maximum effect.  Moore uses this footage to tell 
his version of this story.  Archive footage is the lynchpin of Moore’s attack on the 
president and his staff.  The seven minutes of infamy, Bush’s vacations, Wolfowitz 
licking his comb, and Ashcroft singing are some of the most damning uses of archive 
footage in Fahrenheit 9/11.  Moore uses his role of narrator to buttress the sound bites 
of Bush, Rumsfeld, Rice, Powell, and Cheney by placing them into a context that is 
most useful for him and his analysis of the war in Iraq. 
In counternarrative documentary, archive footage is used to open space for an 
alternative view of history that is suppressed by the official narrative.  Moore 
exemplifies this strategy in the way he reconstructs the context of the war in Iraq.  He 
indicts the Bush administration’s public justifications for the war in Iraq by showing 
the main characters contradicting themselves on the threat posed by Iraq.  Archive 
footage shows how the Bush administration linked Iraq to Al Qaeda and weapons of 
mass destruction and the footage comes from multiple sources including Bush’s State 
of the Union addresses, press conferences and Colin Powell’s testimony before the 
United Nations.  Moore uses these sound bites to argue that the majority of 
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Americans already believed the President because he spent a year convincing them 
that Saddam was a threat.  Moore leads into the discussion of Iraqi links to Al Qaeda 
by showing a clip of Bush from the January 29, 2002 State of the Union Address 
where Bush states, “Saddam Hussein aids and protects terrorists, including members 
of Al Qaeda” (Moore, 2004, p. 79).  He shows Bush stating that Saddam has spent 
enormous sums of money to acquire weapons of mass destruction.  Moore then shows 
Colin Powell before the U.N. making the case to invade Iraq.  This is followed by a 
montage of images with the President,  Rumsfeld, Cheney, Powell, and Rice accusing 
Saddam of pursuing weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) by repeating statements 
like, “Saddam is determined to get his hands on nuclear bomb[sic],” “We know he’s 
got chemical weapons,” and “he’s got them” (Moore, 2004,  p. 78).  After recounting 
the Bush case Moore then interjects to say, “That’s strange because that is not what 
they said when they took office” (2004, p. 79).  He supports this with earlier archive 
footage of Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice showing them contradicting their own 
testimonies.  Powell argues at a press conference in February 2001 that Hussein “has 
not developed significant capabilities when it comes to weapons of mass destruction.  
He is unable to project conventional power against his neighbors” (Moore, 2004, p. 
81).  Then he shows Rice in July 2001 stating, “We are able to keep arms from him 
and his military forces have not been rebuilt” (Moore, 2004, p. 81)  By contrasting 
these statements against the official justifications for war in Iraq Moore hopes to 
persuade the audience that Iraq was not a threat to America.  Further, he wants to 
stress that even if Iraq was a threat it was not for the reasons which were given by the 
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Bush administration.  Evaluating Moore’s strategy of using archive footage to 
undercut official justifications of the Iraq war can be done by testing the probability 
and fidelity of Moore’s arguments using the ARG conditions and the dialectical tier.   
Testing narrative probability and fidelity 
Critics ought to test two things when considering the fidelity and probability 
of Moore’s counternarrative arguments as they apply to the use of archive footage.  
We need to analyze the cogency of the argument and to compare it to other available 
evidence or narratives to test its truth.  In discussing the form of Moore’s use of 
archive footage, I will also discuss its twofold function: to indict the credibility of 
Bush and his staff and to indict the credibility of the justifications for war.   
 First Moore uses the archive footage to indict the credibility of Bush and his 
staff.  From the very beginning of the movie, Moore uses this footage to attack the 
character of Bush and his staff.  Two attacks exemplify this strategy: Wolfowitz 
licking his comb and Ashcroft singing ‘Let the Eagle Soar.’  On face these two scenes 
function as ad hominem attacks; however, there is more to them than just attacking 
the people.  These scenes seek to attack the Bush Administration’s credibility as 
judicious architects of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Visually these scenes argue 
that the people in the administration are distasteful and zealous.  Watching Wolfowitz 
groom himself by licking his comb is distasteful because most people would 
disapprove of this type of grooming.  Even though it is disgusting, it does not prove 
that Wolfowitz is unqualified or bad at his job.  The same is true for Moore’s 
depiction of Ashcroft singing ‘Let the Eagle Soar.’ While it does prove that Ashcroft 
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is overzealous, and a little strange, the question that needs to be asked is does it prove 
that Ashcroft is mentally unfit to do his job as attorney general?  I do not think that it 
does.  Ashcroft can be both overzealous in his patriotism for America but still be 
immensely qualified to be attorney general.  Moore continues his attack on the 
administration by specifically attacking Bush with the use of archive footage.  Moore 
shows Bush making faces before a State of the Union address, being flippant about 
the War on Terror while on the golf course, and sitting in the Florida classroom for 
nearly seven minutes after Andrew Card told Bush that the United States was under 
attack.   
The real questions surrounding these depictions are these: are they acceptable, 
relevant, and do they provide grounds for Moore’s argument.  At first glance, these 
depictions of the Bush administration are acceptable because these depictions are so 
different from how we normally see the members of the administration.  We get the 
impression that this is how these people really are when no one is watching.  In this 
way, these depictions contain a level of perceived authenticity that other more 
professional depictions of them lack.  This strategy spills over into Moore’s 
depictions of Bush overwhelmed by the gravity of 9/11.  He shows Bush unable to 
commit to a decisive course of action in its immediate aftermath.  Likewise, his 
depictions of Ashcroft and Wolfowitz show them being overzealous and distasteful.  
However, when used as grounds to support the overarching argument that these men 
are unfit to lead these arguments are not relevant to that conclusion.  Being distasteful 
or overzealous does not make him or her incompetent to be attorney general or deputy 
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secretary of defense and most importantly, it does not make them liars.  Instead of 
providing factual evidence for his conclusion, Moore wants viewers to infer that 
because they are distasteful and overzealous that they are liars.  However, this 
strategy lacks real evidence to prove that there is an intention or motivation to lie 
about the war in Iraq.  Moore’s reliance on archive footage as grounds to prove these 
arguments hurts the strength of his counternarrative because these are not relevant to 
his premise.  
These depictions also fail the dialectical tier because upon further scrutiny 
they lack acceptability for a general audience because of their tone.  These types of 
attacks open Moore up to indictments of being mean.  One critic called Moore’s 
handling of the issues as “hyperbolic hysteria” (Flowers, 2004, p. 1).  Another added 
it was “mean spirited mockery” (Overstreet, 2004, p. 1).  These indictments of 
Moore’s uses of archive footage help chip away at the credibility of the message 
Moore wants his audiences to accept.  Pontillo (2004) argues, “The biased attack film 
Fahrenheit 9/11 did more to energize apathetic voters than anything Karl Rove could 
have ever dreamed up.  Most Americans do not care for hateful innuendo assaults on 
our commander in chief” (p. A 26).  In short, Moore’s use of archive footage to attack 
the President and his staff undermined the fidelity of his argument because some 
viewers disliked the tone of the movie thus closing off his message to an entire 
portion of his targeted audience, the undecided voter.  While the above attacks are 
directed at Moore, they function to undermine the credibility of his message in the 
same way that Moore intended to undermine the credibility of the administration.  
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These attacks trade off with substantive discussion of the issues that the movie seeks 
to raise.  In this respect, Fahrenheit 9/11 does raise public discussion but not about 
the Iraq war; instead, it raises questions about Michael Moore and his movie.   
 The drawbacks to Moore’s use of archive footage in Fahrenheit 9/11 
outweigh its benefits.  In Fahrenheit 9/11, Moore’s use of archive footage 
overshadows the effective ways that he uses it to inform and argue.  Many of Moore’s 
mainstream critics focus on his use of archive footage to attack the president and find 
it distasteful and unnecessary.  Their condemnation of this strategy limits his 
audience.  You can only persuade the people who will see the movie.  The litany of 
attacks on Moore wore down his movie’s credibility until “a majority of respondents 
(56 percent) said they had neither seen the film nor intended to see it” (Panagopoulos, 
2004, p. 15).  The limited audience allowed a limited effect.   
 The critics of Fahrenheit 9/11 argue that it reinforces an environment of 
partisanship by not showing equal sides to the debate about the Iraq war.  Christopher 
Hitchens (2004a) admits “that a documentary must have a "POV" or point of view 
and that it must also impose a narrative line” (p. 1).  However, he accuses Moore of 
leaving out anything that contradicts his narrative and claims that if the director uses 
non-falsifiable evidence then he may “have betrayed your craft” (Hitchens, 2004a, p. 
1).  Hitchens (2004a) adds that that playing to the audience by showing these images 
of the administration and not relying on fact is “patronizing them and insulting them” 
(p. 1).  To end his line of attack Hitchens (2004a) concludes that anyone “who 
violates this pact with readers or viewers are [sic] to be despised” (p. 1).  Hitchens’ 
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attacks are based on the fact that “at no point does Michael Moore make the smallest 
effort to be objective.  At no moment does he pass up the chance of a cheap sneer or a 
jeer.  He pitilessly focuses his camera, for minutes after he should have turned it off, 
on a distraught and bereaved mother whose grief we have already shared….Such 
courage” (Hitchens, 2004a, p. 1).  Attacks such as these prompted critics to label the 
movie as propaganda because it had a clear ideological slant.  This criticism is 
buttressed by Moore’s unfair depiction of President Bush throughout the film 
(Hitchens, 2004a; Hitchens, 2004b; Isikoff, 2004; Overstreet, 2004; Toppman, 2004).  
These accusations of partisanship created an ideological rift between Moore and the 
audience he needed and wanted to reach.  Recognizing that Moore limits his audience 
by using archive footage to attack the president helps explain why the Bush 
administration’s official narrative remains entrenched.  Moore limited the persuasive 
appeal of his movie in this way and it fails as an effective counternarrative because it 
traded off with substantive discussion about the Iraq war.  
Everyone Can Make a Difference 
 Bush argues throughout his narrative that each American needs to sacrifice for 
the greater good.  Even though this appeal is ambiguous it can be narrowed to when 
he asks citizens to support the troops.  This support never requires a personal 
sacrifice.  Instead, Bush’s argument amounts to the push for a unified citizenry where 
Bush situates Americans as part of something larger than themselves.  He argues that 
“America is embracing a new ethic and a new creed: ‘Let's roll.’  The let’s roll creed 
calls for Americans to support a unified America which promotes the demands of 
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human dignity: the rule of law; limits on the power of the state; respect for women; 
private property; free speech; equal justice; and religious tolerance” (Bush, 2002a, ¶ 
58).  It is Bush’s strategy to construct a unified conscience of the American body 
politic, which trusts the president and supports his decisions without question.  Bush 
jokes about the democratic process, “If this were a dictatorship, it'd be a heck of a lot 
easier, just so long as I'm the dictator” (Bush, 2000, n.p.).  Moore uses this statement 
as a nexus point for his fight against Bush’s politics.  
 The plot of Fahrenheit 9/11 revolves around the man vs. society (in particular 
capitalist business interests) conflict theme.  It is in this milieu that Moore situates his 
conflict with Bush.  Moore pits himself as the everyman against the corporate greed 
of American politics.  In his quest to overthrow the evil dictator (Bush) our 
protagonist also finds likeminded individuals, such as Jim McDermott, Craig Unger, 
and Abdul Henderson, along the way.  No one is more important, however, than Lila 
Lipscomb and her family.  Moore uses Lila Lipscomb to shock his audience back to 
the reality of the impact of war.  Allowing Lila Lipscomb to tell her story is essential 
to Moore’s counternarrative.  Her story, within the larger narrative, gives power to the 
powerless and it frames Moore’s overarching argument, which is that the most 
important people are those who never get to speak.  As such each of their stories 
speaks truth to power and can change our cultural, social, and political existence.  To 
achieve this change Moore uses appeals to pathos.   
Appealing to pathos 
 89 
 
 Perhaps Moore’s most effective strategy throughout Fahrenheit 9/11 is his use 
of emotional appeals to persuade.  The reviews almost unanimously recognized 
Moore’s emotional appeals as the persuasive force of the movie.  Wilmington (2004) 
of the Chicago Tribune writes, “’Fahrenheit’ may provoke, delight or divide its 
audience.  But no one will react indifferently to this shocking, sad, and funny look at 
the Bush administration's handling of terrorism and the Iraqi war.”  He continues, “At 
times it wrenches your heart.  That's the strength of ‘Fahrenheit 9/11’: the way it 
attacks emotions and stings us to laughter, anger, and sorrow.”  Specifically, Moore’s 
use of Lila Lipscomb shocks and saddens the audience.  Strauss (2004), a reviewer 
for USA Today, argues that the scenes with Lila Lipscomb are “gut wrenching and 
haunting” (n.p.).   
 Fisher & Filloy (1987) explain how appeals to emotion function: “through a 
revelation of characters representing different value orientations in conflicts with 
themselves, others, or their environment, the auditor is induced to a felt belief, a sense 
of the message advanced by the work” (p. 161).  This is how literature argues and 
how Moore uses emotional argument throughout his film.  They hold that emotional 
arguments create a belief based on the strength of the emotion that it creates.  Fisher 
& Filloy (1987) continue that the belief “is one based on an immediate, emotional, 
intuitive, response to representation…it is a thought not based on deliberate thought 
or reasoned analysis” (p. 161).  Fisher & Filloy are not arguing that appeals to pathos 
are not reasonable.  Instead, they are arguing that an emotional argument is not a 
traditional reasoned argumentative claim.  Moore wants to elicit an emotional 
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response and does this by drawing someone from the margins to tell her story.  In 
Fahrenheit 9/11, that person is Lila Lipscomb.    
 Lila lost her son in Iraq.  She comes from a family of military people—her 
father, her uncles, and her daughter.  She considers herself a patriot and the armed 
forces a good career choice, and she is raising her family as the all-American family.  
In many ways, Lila Lipscomb is every mother.  She is an archetype being 
(re)constructed right before the audiences’ eyes.  Zizek (2001) in Fright of Real Tears 
explains the conundrum of the documentary filmmaker when it comes to displaying 
emotions.  The filmmaker must at the same time be frightened by the emotions of his 
subjects but want to catch their real grief and anguish on camera.  This conundrum is 
precisely the position the audience is placed in with Lila as we watch her grieve 
onscreen and blame herself and her country for the loss of her son.  Her tears are real.  
Even Moore’s critics recognize the power of his appeals to emotion (Overstreet, 
2004; Kopel, 2004; Hitchens, 2004a).  Some even argued that he went for these 
emotional appeals instead of reasoned argument (e.g. Overstreet, 2004).  However, 
Moore’s fans argue that his emotional appeals are key to overcoming the strength of 
Bush’s narrative.  Hamill (2004) describes his and the audiences’ reaction: “I was as 
emotionally moved by the applause as I was by the film, because that was the 
powerful sound of Joe Public” (p. 240).  These emotions are where Moore hoped to 
lead the audience.  Part of his strategy was to infuriate, cajole, and direct the audience 
to action.  
Testing narrative fidelity and probability 
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 While emotion as argument lacks a formal structure it can be analyzed and 
evaluated using the tests for arguments from example and formal propriety.  The tests 
for example involve the ARG conditions with the addition of determining if the 
example is typical (representative).  Is Lila Lipscomb a representative example?  
While she is only one woman, her story of the grieving mother is an old one.  It 
traverses time and wars.  She is used—correctly—as a representative example.  As an 
argument, Lila’s story relates to the audience and is acceptable because it coalesces 
with what the audience already believes about a mother’s response to the loss of a 
child.  She gives reasons in both verbal and visual ways.  However, the power of her 
argument is not in its form, but its function.  She touches people and allows them to 
suspend their disbelief and adjust the weight of their reasoning so that the logical 
contradictions and leaps of faith are easy to make with the story when we find 
ourselves emotionally involved (Goodnight, 2005).  It seems reasonable to argue that 
a mother’s loss of her child is an emotion with which American audiences can 
identify.  Even if viewers have never lost a child, it is likely they have lost someone 
close to them and as such understand the feeling of loss.  By elevating Lila Lipscomb 
as the synecdoche of all mothers who have lost a child in the Iraq war, Moore creates 
an argument that builds on the shared assumption that losing a child is a terrible 
emotional and physical loss.  The attempt to link this shared assumption to an 
emotional appeal and then to action is where Moore’s argument begins to unravel.     
 To understand and evaluate emotional appeals is not easy, but formal 
propriety can help.  When “rhetoric appeals to the emotions, it is by proving the truth 
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of an emotional judgment or by using the connection between emotional judgment 
and emotional desire to prove the desirability of an action” (Register, 1999, p. 1).  
Manolescu (2004), drawing on Kenneth Burke, explains that emotional appeals can 
be evaluated by analyzing formal propriety.  In other words, does the rhetor create 
and fulfill expectations by using an emotional appeal?  These expectations are based 
on norms or assumptions which can be gleaned from the social and cultural context of 
the rhetor and audience.  The “formal appeal involves aligning assumptions which, in 
turn, ‘contributes to the formation of attitudes, and thus to the determining of 
conduct’” (Manolescu, 2004, p. 116).  The film fulfills our expectation of what that 
pain must be when Lila recounts the phone call from the Secretary of Defense 
informing her that her son, Michael Pedersen, has been killed.  She states “the grief 
grabbed me so hard that I literally fell on the floor…and I remember screaming ‘Why 
did they have to take my son?” (Moore, 2004, p. 115).  Taking it further Lila reads a 
letter from her son, which excoriates Bush and his handling of the war on terror.  
While we watch her read this letter she breaks down multiple times.  In fact, the stage 
directions note “Lila is overcome with emotion” (Moore, 2004, p. 118).  The 
recognition of Lila as representative of mothers who have lost a child to war is where 
Moore generates the most powerful emotional appeal in the movie.  Allowing Lila to 
tell her story adds force to Moore’s counternarrative against the Bush administration.  
She shows that telling your story can make a difference and that each of us should not 
be afraid to come forward.  As synecdoche, Lila shows that good people should 
disagree with a bad war.  Unfortunately, Moore’s use of Lila Lipscomb does a good 
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job of generating discussion about the movie but fails to spillover into discussion 
about the merits of the Iraq war.  Even though audiences empathize with Lila her 
narrative is polysemic.  On the one hand, it can be read as an antiwar 
counternarrative.  On the other hand,  it can be read as evidence of Bush’s call to 
support the troops with thought and appropriate emotional response rather than action 
and genuine sacrifice.  Because of its polysemic nature, Lila’s counternarrative lacks 
the power to generate the public debate that Moore had hoped.  In this respect 
Moore’s use of Lila Lipscomb is a failure of form because it like his use of archive 
footage  does not generate a broader public discussion of the war.     
Conclusion  
   Michael Moore’s Fahrenheit 9/11 was a groundbreaking movie in many 
respects.  It was the first documentary to open number one at the box office and, to 
date, it is the largest grossing documentary of all time.  These accomplishments 
should not be overlooked because they make this movie significant.  However, even 
though it succeeds in many ways it failed in others.  Moore had hoped that his movie 
would compel the American electorate to vote Bush out of office and to support 
withdrawal from Iraq.  Neither of these goals was accomplished.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
Fahrenheit 9/11 as a Failure of Form and Function 
 It has been purpose of this thesis to analyze the process of the failure.  I began 
by asking the question why Moore’s movie failed to generate enough momentum to 
achieve its goals.  I came up with one overarching answer: it lacked fidelity.  By 
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analyzing the form and function of Fahrenheit 9/11 as counternarrative I argue that 
Moore’s movie was unable to withstand the critical questioning of the dialectical tier 
because some of the arguments which Moore relied heavily on lacked cogency.  This 
problem was compounded by the fact that the arguments which had cogency failed to 
spillover and generate public discussion about the inadequacies of Bush’s official 
narrative.                                                                                                                 
 Fahrenheit 9/11 failed to generate public deliberation.  The first hour of 
Moore’s movie was set up to destroy the image of George W. Bush and his 
administration.  Moore wanted to undermine “Bush’s image of dignity and 
credibility” (Toplin, 2006, p. 91).  To achieve this end Moore’s strategies relied on 
argument by inference and ad hominen attacks.  However, these attacks lacked the 
cogency and relevance that were critical for them to be effective.  The evidence 
necessary for Moore to draw linkages that would implicate Bush in corruption 
scandals was not there.  Even when he tried to provide reasoning to fill in the gaps of 
his evidence these reasons were unable to withstand the critical questioning of the 
dialectic.  In this regard Moore’s arguments lacked grounds and that destroyed their 
cogency.  
 Moore’s counternarrative also failed because his strategies invited criticism of 
his credibility instead of creating public debate about the war.  Moore uses his 
position as narrator and creator to create inferential cues for the audience.  These 
inferential cues allow Moore to lead the audience to his desired conclusion and hence 
allow the movie to achieve a sense of coherence.  Moore has to exclude many 
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arguments which would contradict his due to time and an interest of narrative 
integrity.  When these arguments are exposed it looks as if Moore is lying or did poor 
research.  Either way it weakens his credibility and becomes a staging platform for 
the personal attacks against Moore.  Many of the attacks that have been leveled at 
Fahrenheit 9/11 have been leveled at the director.  Both Isikoff (2004) and Hitchens 
(2004a & b) attack Moore personally.  Critics have attacked Moore for his lack of 
finesse and nuance when attacking Bush (Isikoff, 2004; Toppman 2004).  Others have 
even argued that “the writer-director injects himself into the proceedings . . . and his 
grandstanding ploys smell of juvenile egotism” (Toppman, 2004, n.p.).  These attacks 
serve to taint Moore’s message because they undermine his credibility as a source of 
fact.  Diminishing a rhetor’s ethos is one way to attack the message, especially if the 
message is non-falsifiable like much of Moore’s argument.  When an argument is 
evidenced and has a factual basis, attacking the arguer has little effect on the truth-
value of the argument.  However, when the argument is based entirely on the 
credibility of the speaker then attacking credibility is a way to attack the argument. 
 Lila Lipscomb’s narrative lacked relevance.  It is interesting to think of Lila’s 
narrative as both important and irrelevant at the same time.  Moore’s strategy is to use 
Lila as an emotional lever to generate public discussion and adherence from his 
audience, and for some it accomplished this goal.  However, the polysemic nature of 
her narrative allowed her narrative to spin against Moore’s goals.  Simply put, the 
audience was able to sympathize with Lila and still only support the troops rather than 
genuinely sacrifice.  In fact, the sympathy that the audience felt for Lila and her story 
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gives a reason to support the official narrative and the Bush administration.  Her 
narrative can be read as: while there are many grieving mothers around the country 
the only way we can help them is to support our troops with whatever they need to 
win the war and bring them home.  Herein lays the problem Moore shows no 
incompatibility between the sympathy that the audience felt and the Bush narrative.  
In other words, we understand that her losing her son is terrible but how does this 
prove that Iraq is not a threat to America?  It does not.  Her narrative does not speak 
to the terror threat or many of the other justifications that the administration gave for 
intervention in Iraq.  At best, her narrative is an anti-war sentiment.  It shows a 
mother against war but it could be any war.  There is nothing in particular about her 
narrative, which indicts this particular war.  In this way, it lacks relevance to the 
justifications for this war.  It hurts to watch Lila but we can empathize and still 
support the war and the troops: it plays into the Bush narrative by calling for us to 
support the troops but never sacrifice personally.    
Fahrenheit 9/11 opens space for marginalized voices 
 However, Moore was extremely successful in two regards.  His movie was a 
vehicle allowing the marginalized to speak, like Corporal Abdul Henderson and Lila 
Lipscomb.  Without the platform of Fahrenheit 9/11 it is unlikely that Lila Lipscomb 
or Corporal Henderson’s stories would have ever been heard.  At the time the movie 
came out there were few public forums, aside from internet sites, which brought 
dissenters into the open to tell their stories.   
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 It has been the purpose of this chapter to show how Moore’s movie fit the 
category of a counternarrative and to explain how it worked.  In Chapter Five, I will 
conclude this study by evaluating the heuristic value of the theory of counternarrative.  
I will also show the direction for future research and reflect upon the artifact and its 
impact since the election of 2004.    
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Chapter 5: Conclusion and Implications 
 It is my purpose to study the form and function of counternarrative by 
applying a theory of counternarrative to a text.  Specifically this essay asks, why did 
Michael Moore’s Fahrenheit 9/11, fail as a counternarrative?  In an attempt to answer 
this question, I proceeded in three steps.  I developed a theory of counternarrative, 
established the official narrative, and analyzed the counternarrative through the 
application of rational argument testing and the dialectical tier.    
 Chapter 2 developed a theory of counternarrative by analyzing narrative 
theory and adding rational argument testing.  Fisher (1987) argues that narrative does 
not function by using rational forms of argument but uses abstract concepts such as 
fidelity and probability to determine its power.  It has been my argument that fidelity 
and probalbity explain how a single rhetorical act functions but does little to explain 
how one narrative displaces another, or how to evaluate competing narratives.  
Scholars (Rowland 1987; Warnick, 1987) have argued that narrative needs argument 
but have yet to develop a systemic approach.  This essay begins the process of 
creating a narrative framework that evaluates competing narratives.  For this reason 
counternarrative is important.   
Counternarrative bridges these gaps in narrative theory.  Counternarrative 
form has three basic parts: it must be a narrative, it must directly argue against 
another narrative, and it must open space for marginalized voices.  Moreover, the 
counternarrative must invigorate public debate and discussion.  This provides a 
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starting point for the discussion of how counternarratives differ from traditional 
narratives.  The strength of this study comes from creating a framework that explains 
the process of narrative argumentation and how marginalized narratives attempt to 
displace official narratives.    
To explain this process two steps are critical: ascertaining the official 
narrative and contrasting it to the counternarrative.  This begins the process of 
dialectical interrogation which is the crux of this essay.  In Chapter 3, I expose how 
the Bush narrative followed a model of war rhetoric by analyzing Bush’s five main 
presidential speeches from September 2001 through October 2002.  These speeches 
construct a narrative environment that laid the groundwork for the invasions in Iraq 
and Afghanistan.  Bush used rhetoric to define the meaning of 9/11 in narrative terms.  
He defined the U.S. fight against terrorism and Al Qaeda as the eternal struggle of 
good against evil, where all citizens are forced to choose a side, them or us.  By 
rhetorically defining the tragedy and hence the nation’s actions in a Manichean 
fashion Bush effectively disabled thoughtful deliberation and discouraged dissent 
against the official post-9/11 narrative.  This rhetorical environment created the 
impetus for Moore to produce Fahrenheit 9/11 
Fahrenheit 9/11 is a counternarrative responding to Bush’s official description 
of 9/11.  Chapter 4 analyzes the strategies and arguments that Moore formulates in an 
attempt to transform the narrative meaning of 9/11.  Moore used argument by 
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inference, archival footage, and argument through pathos to counter some of Bush’s 
major claims.   
 Moore uses argument by inference to implicate Bush in corruption.  
Following 9/11, Bush established himself as the trusted leader of America.  Moore 
counters this by arguing that Bush had links to multiple multinational corporations, 
which were profiting from the wars.  For Moore this was proof that this war was only 
about money.  Moore also uses archive footage to argue that Bush lied about his 
motives in attacking Iraq.  This was further proof for Moore that multinational 
business interests had corrupted the administration.  The problem with these 
arguments is that Moore never provides any evidence to substantiate these claims.  
This created real problems for the fidelity of Moore’s counternarrative because many 
of Moore’s critics focused on these specious arguments.  This argument also 
functioned to imply that since the reasons for the war were lies then Americans 
should no longer support the war based on lies. Unfortunately, these arguments failed 
to generate public debate or discussion about the war in Iraq.  Instead, they created 
massive debates about Moore, his ethics, and the truthiness of the movie but traded-
off with discussions about the war in Iraq.  Moore’s final strategy is to argue through 
the use of emotion.  This is Moore’s most compelling argument in the film.  
However, its polysemic nature allows it to be read as a reason to support the Bush 
narrative and the troops.  While everyone identifies with the pain that Lila has for 
losing her son, this does not lead everyone to the same conclusion.  For some it might 
mean we should withdraw from Iraq.  For others it might mean that we should fully 
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support our troops so that we can end this war and ensure no more Lila’s.  In this 
way, the persuasive impact of Lila only has fidelity for those who reach the same 
conclusion as Moore.  This type of strategy limits the members of the audience who 
can adhere to the narrative.  It was my intention in these chapters to show how a 
narrative rises to the official level and how a counternarrative goes about responding 
to it.  By examining this process I also recognized the implications and the need for 
further research of my theory and its application.   
Implications 
 This study has two important implications for the study of rhetorical criticism, 
narrative criticism, and argument theory: explanatory and practical.  Counternarrative 
provides a framework to evaluate competing narratives.  Using the dialectic and 
applying it to competing narratives clarifies the strengths and weaknesses of an 
official narrative.  This use of rational argument testing within the dialectical tier can 
expose the contradictions and fallacies that are inherent in the official narrative.  
However, if the official narrative’s arguments are stronger, then it can be predicted 
that the counternarrative will fail.  In addition, this is what happened to Fahrenheit 
9/11.  The arguments contained in Fahrenheit were not as acceptable, on a national 
scale, as those of the Bush administration.  Hence, Fahrenheit failed to dislodge 
Bush’s story.  Moore relies too heavily on inference, poor research, and ad hominen 
attack as strategies to displace the official Bush narrative.  In our media driven 
society Moore’s movie needed to stand up to massive criticism from both the 
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mainstream press and ideological right.  However, the gaps in his argument became 
focal points that helped undermine both the fidelity and probability of Moore’s 
narrative.  Within this dialectic a counternarrative can succeed when it is the best 
explanation for an event and can stand up to critical questioning.   
 The other important advantage for this theory and its application is that it is 
generalizable and parsimonious.  This theory, like narrative, can be applied to a 
variety of texts.  These texts can range from written, spoken, to visual texts or a text 
that combines all three, like Fahrenheit 9/11.  The ability to use this theory to explain 
an array of texts is due to is simplicity.  For a theory to be usable, it should be simple.  
An advantage to this theory of counternarrative is that its application is not 
complicated.  Finding the premises and analyzing their acceptability, relevance, and 
grounds is a simple process as is using the dialectical tier.  In the dialectical tier the 
critic amasses the available evidence and reads it to find how it differs or agrees with 
the counternarrative.  She then shows how this evidence affects probability or fidelity.  
Overall, this process may be time-consuming but is not hard.  Counternarrative theory 
also expands the explanatory framework to create a deeper understanding of how 
narratives and counternarratives work and how they gain adherence from their 
audiences.   
Suggestions for Further Research 
 This thesis is only the beginning of the study of counternarratives; it certainly 
is not the final word on counternarrative theory.  As such, there are ways in which to 
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extend the research of counternarrative theory and in particular Fahrenheit 9/11. 
Counternarrative theory might be expanded to include other tools from narrative 
criticism which illuminate how film narratives work.  In particular understanding 
films starting points and its scene construction will inform future critics about the 
arguments the films creators are trying to make.  By using in media res and mis-en-
scene a rhetorical critic can unpack the visual elements of the film’s narrative.  
 In media res literally means “in the middle of things” (Pierce, 2003, p. 194) 
and since all stories must begin somewhere where they begin is often significant.  
Moore begins Fahrenheit 9/11 at an Al Gore rally celebrating his win of Florida and 
the 2000 election, only to stop it in the middle and run the same scene in reverse.  
This begins the narrative visually and rhetorically.  Showing the scene in reverse is a 
powerful reminder that the major news networks had to rescind their prediction in 
favor of Gore winning Florida.  For Moore this is the middle of the Bush narrative 
and he shows this by jumping into Bush’s past early in the movie. However, it 
functions as the beginning of the movie.  The decision by the director of starting 
points “is critical to both initial impressions and believable extensions in story 
creation” (Pierce, 2003, p. 195). In other words, in media res is an important element 
in understanding how a visual narrative creates narrative fidelity.  This is also true for 
mis-en-scene which also contributes to the narrative’s fidelity and probability. 
 Mis-en-scene is a French term which means “placed in a scene” (Pierce, 2003, 
p. 192).  What goes into a scene and what that means is a part of narrative criticism 
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which was overlooked by this thesis, because of its focus on argument.  Yet, scene 
construction-which includes lighting, actor placement, scenery, props, streetscapes 
and so forth- is an important element in deciphering the meaning of a film and its 
parts.  For Moore this is especially important in Fahrenheit because most of the film 
is archive footage and voice over.  The scenes which are actually filmed help shape 
the narrative’s probability and fidelity by their use of certain objects.  This is very 
evident in the scene where Moore rents an ice cream truck and drives around Capitol 
Hill reading them Patriot Act over a loud speaker.  The decision to construct this 
whole scene can be read from multiple perspectives but each reading will influence 
how the critic assesses the probability and fidelity of the movie.  These two elements 
can be used by narrative critics to expand their discussion of narrative in a way that 
this thesis does not cover.  In this thesis I was more concerned with how arguments 
are constructed through narrative and against narrative.  It has been my contention 
that counternarrative must begin with the unpacking of arguments.   
Counternarrative theory should be an evolving concept.  The theory of 
counternarrative presented here is simple.  Because of this, it runs the risk of being 
overly simple.  The world is complex and simple explanations can miss the mark and 
leave out important variables, which can change a critic’s analysis.  Explanations for 
the world do not always fall into easy categories such as form and function or the 
binaries of center and margins.  Often these concepts are unstable, shifting, 
overlapping, reinforcing, and subverting themselves and each other all at the same 
time.  Oversimplifying how or why a counternarrative works can undermine our 
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scholarship on dissent, discussion, and public debate and create a Manichean 
worldview we are seeking to avoid with our rigorous analysis of an artifact.  In 
studying Fahrenheit 9/11 or other potentially partisan attempts at persuasion, the 
critic must be aware of the dangers of reifying these binary structures and seek to 
explain the discourse so that it evaluates and illuminates aspects of the discourse that 
add to the debate by adding another voice to the discussion.  Further analysis of 
Fahrenheit 9/11 should be done using other methods.  There are many ways to 
engage this text for the critic and we should try to engage it from multiple rhetorical 
perspectives.  Narrative and counternarrative is but one way to look at this text.  Post-
modern theories of media criticism, cultural criticism, deconstruction, Burke, Marxist, 
and psychoanalytic theories can all give a different perspective on Moore’s strategies 
and their outcomes, and each is important to adding a differing voice on the current 
political situation and how it affects audiences.   
 Future studies can also enter into the larger discussion of the role of the media 
as a conduit for official narratives and counternarratives.  Simply put, it is important 
to examine the role the mainstream media plays in perpetuating or challenging an 
official narrative.  When the media challenges narratives it creates instability for an 
official narrative and allows vigorous public debate to occur.  Absent media criticism, 
an official narrative can take on factual quality.  This is similar to what happened to 
the Bush narrative.  Moore recognizes this and attempts to expose the media’s 
complicity in Bush’s war rhetoric, which was directly responsible for the wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq.  He argues it was their responsibility to question Bush’s 
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motives and information.  Instead, what he shows is media refusing to debate, dissent, 
or question Bush.  It seems Moore believes that the media should function as a fourth 
branch of the government providing checks and balances to maintain the balance of 
power.  After 9/11 that did not happen.  The media’s lack of questions only 
strengthened the fidelity of Bush’s narrative and hence made Moore’s job even 
tougher.  This might explain why Moore’s counternarrative had so much trouble 
gaining traction and circulating outside of an already disenfranchised portion of the 
electorate.   
     
 107 
 
References 
Apotheloz, D. Brandt, P-Y. Gustavo, G. (1992).  How counter-argumentation works 
 in Blair, J.A., van Eemeren, F.H., Grootendorst, R., Willard, C.A.,  
 Argumentation Illuminated.  Amsterdam: International Society for the Study 
 of Argumentation (172-177). 
Aronson, E & Pratkanis, A.R. (1991).  Age of propaganda : The everyday use and 
 abuse of persuasion.  New York: W.H. Freeman & Company 
Barone, M. (2004). The company they keep. U.S. News & World Report, 137 , 41. 
Bennett, W. L., & Edelman , M. (1985). Toward a new political narrative.  Journal of  
 Communication (35),4. 156-171. 
Blackburn, S. (1996).  The oxford dictionary of philosophy.  Oxford: Oxford 
 University Press.  
Boorman, E.G. (1985). Symbolic convergence theory: A communication formulation. 
 Journal of Communication, 35 128-138. 
Brummett, B. (1984). Burke's representative anecdote as a method in media criticism.  
 Critical Studies in Mass Communication, (1) 161-176. 
Brummett, B. (1985). Electric literature as equipment for living: haunted house films.  
 Critical Studies in Mass Communication, (2), 247-261. 
Burke, K. (1939). The rhetoric of Hitler’s battle."'  The Southern Review(5) pp.1-21 
 108 
 
Burke, K. (1967).  Philosophy of literary form.  Berkeley: University of California 
 Press. 
Burke, K. (1966).  Terministic Screens. In Language as symbolic action.  Berkeley:  
 University of California Berkeley Press p. 43-62  
Burke, K. (1969a).  Grammar of motives.  Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Burke, K. (1969b).  Rhetoric of motives.  Berkeley: University of California Press.  
Bush, G.W. (2000). Transition of power: President-elect Bush meets with 
 congressional leaders  on capitol hill. CNN.com. Retrieved August 30, 2007 
 from http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0012/18/nd.01.html 
Bush, G.W. (2001, September 20). The state of the union address.  Retrieved May 12, 
 2007 from http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/09.20.01.html.  
Bush, G.W. (2002a, January 29).  The state of the union address. Retrieved May 12, 
 2007 from http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/01.29.02.html.  
Bush, G.W. (2002b, June 1). Commencement speech at West Point.  Retrieved May 
 12, 2007 from http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/06.01.02.html.  
Bush, G.W. (2002c, September 12). Remarks to the U.N. Retrieved May 12, 2007, 
 from http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/09.12.02.html.  
Bush, G.W. (2002d, October 7).  The Iraq threat.  Retrieved May 12, 2007 from 
 http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/10.7.02.html,  
 109 
 
CNN.COM, (2003, January 14).  Bush’s job approval rating drops.  Retrieved, May 
 12, 2007 from 
 http://www.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/01/14/bush.poll/index.html.  
Campbell, K.C. & Jamieson, K.H. (1990).  Deeds done in words: Presidential 
 rhetoric and genres of governance. University of Chicago Press: Chicago Il. 
Chang, N. (2002).  Silencing political dissent: How post September 11 anti-terrorism 
measures threaten our civil liberties.  St. Paul: Seven Stories Press.  
Corliss, R. (2004). The world according to Michael.  Time, 164 (2), 62-70. 
Delicath, J.W & Deluca, K.M. (2003).  Image events, the public sphere, and 
 argumentative  practice: the case of radical environmental groups.”  
 Argumentation 17: 315-333.  
Editors.  (2004).   Michael Moore's summer blockbuster. Cineaste, 29 (4), 1. 
Fisher, W. (1984). Narration as human communication paradigm: the case of public 
 moral argument.  Quarterly Journal of Speech, 51, 1-22. 
Fisher, W. R. (1985 December). The narrative paradigm: an elaboration.  
 Communication Monographs (52),  347-367. 
Fisher, W. R. (1987).  Human communication as narration: Toward a philosophy of 
 reason, value, and action. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press. 
 110 
 
Flowers, P. (2004, June 25). Anti-Bush screed potent but flawed.  South Florida Sun 
 Sentinel, p. 6  
Follman, M. (2004).  O'Reilly declares war on Moore and hollywood nazis. Retrieved 
 Nov. 8, 2005, from Salon.com Website
 http://www.salon.com/opinion/right_hook/2004/06/16/nazi_libs/index_np.htm
 l. 
Foss, S. (2004).  Rhetorical Criticism: exploration and practice. 3rd ed. Long Grove, 
 Il: Waveland Press. 
Freely, A. (2004). Argumentation and debate:  Critical thinking for reasoned decision 
 making. Belmont: Wadsworth 
Funnell, W. (1998). The narrative and its place in the new accounting history: the rise 
 of the counternarrative. Accounting, Auditing, & Accountability (11), 2, 142-
 162 
Giroux, H.A. (1996). Is there a place for cultural studies in colleges of education?  In 
 Colin Lankshear and Michael Peters (Eds.), Counternarratives: Cultural 
 studies and critical pedagogies in postmodern spaces (pp. 41-58).  New York, 
 NY: SUNY.  
Gitlin, T. (2003, January/February).  America’s age of empire: The Bush doctrine.  
 Retrieved May, 12, 2007 from
 :http://www.motherjones.com/commentary/columns/2003/01/ma_205_01.htm
 l?welcome=true. 
 111 
 
Goodnight, G. T. (2005). The Passion of the Christ meets Fahrenheit 9/11: a study in 
 celebrity advocacy.  American Behavioral Scientists. 49, 410-435.  
Govier, Trudy: 1998, ‘Arguing forever?  Or: Two tiers of argument appraisal’, in 
 Hans V. Hansen et al. (eds.), Argumentation & Rhetoric (CD Rom), OSSA, 
 St. Catherine’s, Ontario, 14 pp. 
Govier, T. (2005). A practical study of argument. NewYork: Wadsworth 
Grossberg, L. (1993).  Can cultural studies find true happiness in communication?  
 Journal of Communication, (43), 4, 89-97 
Hamill, D. (2004, June 29). Moore’s message delivered, big-time. Reprinted in M. 
 Moore’s (ed) The official Fahrenheit 9/11 reader.  New York: Simon & 
 Schuster.   
Hansen, H.V. (2002). An exploration of Johnson’s sense of argument. 
 Argumentation(16), 263-276.   
Higgins, L. A.  (2005) Documentary in the age of terror.  South Central Review 22.2 . 
 20-38 
Hitchens, C. (2004a).  UnFahrenheit 9/1: the lies of Michael Moore.  Retrieved Mar. 
 21, 2006, from Slate.com Website: http://www.slate.com/id/2102723/. 
Hitchens, C. (2004b).  Why i'm (slightly) for bush. Retrieved Mar. 21, 2006, from 
 The Nation Website: http://www.thenation.com/doc/20041108/hitchens. 
 112 
 
Holbert, R. L., & Hansen, G. J. Fahrenheit 9-11, Need for closure, and the priming of 
 affective  ambivalence: An assessment of intra-affective structures by party 
 identification. Human Communication Research (32), 2.  109-129 
Isikoff, M. (2004, June 28). Under the hot lights: Moore’s movie will make waves.  
 But it’s a fine line between fact and fanaticism.  Deconstructing Fahrenheit 
 9/11.   Newsweek, p. 29   
Isikoff, M. & Hosenball, M. (2004, June 30).  Terror watch: More distortions from 
 Michael Moore. Newsweek.com. Accessed July 30, 2007 from 
 http://www.newsweek.com/id/53910/page/1 
Iraqbodycount. Org. (2006, October 9th).  Civilians reported killed by military 
 intervention in Iraq. http://www.iraqbodycount.org/.  
Johnson, R. H. (2000).  Manifest Rationality, Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum 
 Associates. 
Jones, A. (2003, February 10).  Total police state takeover.  Retrieved May 12, 2007 
 from: http://www.infowars.com/print/PATRIOT_act/alexs_analysis.htm.  
Koopman, C.  Butler, L.D., Das, B., Palesh, O., McDermott, P., Forero-Puerta, T., 
 Das, B., Poindexter, T., Endress, P.  (2006).   The effects of watching Michael 
 Moore’s Fahrenheit 9/11 on voting intentions, moods, and beliefs: Why 
 president Bush and his administration initiated war in Iraq.  Peace and 
 Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 12 (2), 139-156. 
 113 
 
Kopel, D. (2004).  Fifty-nine deceits in Fahrenheit 9/11.  Retrieved July 30 2006 
 from http://www.davekopel.com/Terror/Fiftysix-Deceits-in-Fahrenheit-
 911.htm 
Kverbekk, T. (2002).  On the argumentative quality of explanatory narratives.  In 
 Blair J.A., Henkamens, A.F.S., van Emeren, F.H. & Willard, C.A.  Anyone 
 who has a view: Theoretical contributions to the study of argumentation.  
 Amsterdam: Springer   
Kwiatkowski, K. (2007, January, 15).  Making sense of the Bush doctrine.  Retrieved 
 May 12, 2007 from 
 http://www.lewrockwell.com/kwiatkowski/kwiatkowski170.html. 
Lankshear, C. & Peters, M (1996). Postmodern counternarratives. In Giroux, H.A., 
 Lankshear, C., McLaren, P., &  Peters, M. (Eds.), Counternarratives: Cultural 
 studies and critical pedagogies in postmodern spaces, (pp.1-40).  New York, 
 NY: SUNY.   
Leff, M. (2000).  Rhetoric and dialectic in the twenty-first century.  Argumentation 
 (14). 241-254 
Leiber, K.A. & Leiber, R.J.  (2002). The Bush national security strategy.  Retrieved 
 May 12, 2007 from: http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/1202/ijpe/pj7-
 4lieber.htm.  
 114 
 
Lutz, W.D. (2003, September 7).  The rhetoric of fear: Unveiling the message behind 
 the president’s pronouncements since the terrorist attacks.  Retrieved May 12, 
 2007 from http://www.commondreams.org/views03/0907-06.htm,  
Lyotard, J.F. (1984).  The postmodern condition. London, UK: Manchester University 
 Press. 
Mander, J (1978). The four arguments for the elimination of television.  New York: 
 Harper-Collins.  
Manolescu, B. I. (2004).  Formal propriety as rhetorical norm.  Argumentation, (18), 
 1, 113-125. 
Mattson, K. (2004).  More on Moore.  Retrieved August 24, 2006, from Dissent 
 Magazine online Website: http://oak.cats.ohiou.edu/~mattson/Moore.htm,  
McGee, M. C., & Nelson,J. S. (1985). Narrative reason in public argument.  Journal 
 of Communication, 35(4), 139-155. 
Meese, E. & Carafano, J.J. (2004, September 2).  Avoiding a rush to failure.  
 Heritage press release.  Retrieved June 30, 2006 from 
 http://www.heritage.org/Press/Commentary/ed090204a.cfm  
McLaren, P. & Hammer, R.  (1996).Media knowledges, warrior citizenry, and 
 postmodern illiteracies.  In Giroux, H.A., Lankshear, C., McLaren, P., &  
 Peters, M. (Eds.), Counternarratives: Cultural studies and critical pedagogies 
 in postmodern spaces, (pp.81-116).  New York, NY: SUNY.   
 115 
 
Moore, M (2004).  The official Fahrenheit 9/11 reader.  New York, NY: Simon & 
 Schuster.   
Morales, F. (2003, December).  Homeland defense: The pentagon declares war on 
 America. Retrieved Mat 12, 2007 from: 
 http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/MOR312A.html.  
Miller, M.C. (2005).  None dare call it stolen.  Retrieved April 10, 2005 from 
 Harpers.org. Website: http://www.harpers.org/ExcerptNoneDare.html,  
Murphy, J.M. (2003). Our mission our moment.  Rhetoric & Public Affairs, (6), 4, 
 607-32 
Nolley, K. (2005). Fahrenheit 9/11: Documentary, truth telling, and politics.  Film & 
 History: A Interdisciplinary Journal of Film and Television Studies 35.2 
 (2005) 12-16 
Nuzzo, A. (2005). The philosophical challenge of September 11.  Malden, MA : 
 Blackwell Publishing. 
Olsen, G. (2003).  Reconsidering unreliability: Fallible and untrustworthy narrators. 
 Narrative (11)1, 93-110 
Orwell, G. (1961).  1984.  London: Signet Classics.  
Overstreet, J. (2004). Fahrenheit 9/11 [Review of the documentary film Fahrenheit 
9/11].  Looking Closer.com, Accessed August 10 2007 from   
 116 
 
 http://lookingcloser.org/movie%20reviews/A-G/fahrenheit911.htm 
Panagopoulos, C. (2004, July 19).  Don’t believe the hype: ‘Fahrenheit 9/11’ is a  
 good ad, but it won’t swing the election.  Adweek (45) 28, p. 15.  
Pease, D. E. (1997).  National narratives, postnational narration, MFS Modern Fiction 
 Studies (43) 1, p. 1-23 
Pollitt, K. (2004, July 19).  Moore 1, media 0.  The Nation. 293, (2),  p. 12 
Pontillo, F. (2004, November 8).  Film helped Bush.  South Florida Sun-Sentinel, p. 
 26A 
Porton, R. (2004).  Weapon of mass instruction: Michael Moore's Fahrenheit 9/11.  
 Cineaste, 29(4), 3-7. 
Rampton, S. & Stauber, J. (2003).  Weapons of mass deception: The uses of 
 propaganda in Bush’s war in Iraq.  New York, NY: Penguin.  
Register, B.  (1999, May 1). The logic and validity of emotional appeals in classical 
 Greek rhetorical theory.  Retrieved November 10, 2007 from 
 http://enlightenment.supersaturated.com/essays/text/bryanregister/thesis/intro.
 html 
Rhoads, K. (2004).  Backdraft 9/11: A backlash against Michael Moore on election 
 day.  Retrieved November 8 2005, Website: 
 http://www.workingpsychology.com/backdraft911.html  
 117 
 
Roe, E. & van Eeten M.J.G. (2004). Three—not two—major environmental 
 counternarratives to globalization. Global environmental politics (4), 4, 36-53. 
Rosenzweig, P. (2004, November 10). The Ashcroft legacy: Liberty and security.  
 Web Memo 607.  Retrieved June 10, 2006, from 
 http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandSecurity/wm607.cfm?renderforpr
 int=1 
Rowland , R. (1987). Narrative: mode of discourse or paradigm.  Communication 
 Monographs.54, 264-275. 
Rowland, R. (1988). The value of the rational world and narrative paradigms.  
 Central States  Speech Journal, 39, 204-217. 
Rowland , R. (1989).  On limiting the narrative paradigm: three cases studies .  
 Communication Monographs , 56, 112-120. 
Rutenberg, J. (2004, May 5).  Disney is blocking distribution of film that criticizes 
 Bush.  The New York Times.  p. A1 
Scheer, C., Scheer, R, Chaudhry, L. (2003).  The five biggest lies Bush told us about 
 Iraq.  St. Paul: Seven Stories Press 
Semmler, S. (2003). Fetching good out of evil: George W. Bush’s post 9/11 rhetoric.  
 Speaker and Gavel 40, 67-90. 
 118 
 
Silberstein, S. (2002). War of words: Language, politics, and 9/11. New York, NY: 
 Routledge. 
Strauss, G. (2004, June 20). The truth about Michael Moore.  USA Today.  Retrieved 
 September 9, 2005.  http://www.usatoday.com/life/movies/news/2004-06-20-
 moore_x.htm,  
Time Warner,(2005). Trusted editing, the best brands in the business.  Time inc. 
 Retrieved Nov. 8, 2005, from Time Warner 
 Website:http://www.timewarner.com/corp/businesses/detail/time_inc/ 
Tindale, C.W. (2002).  A concept divided:  Ralph Johnson’s definition of argument.  
 Argumentation (16), 3.  299-309 
Toplin, R.B., (2006).  Michael Moore’s Fahrenheit 9/11: How one film divided a 
 nation. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas 
Toplin, R.B., (2005).  The long battle over Fahrenheit 9/11: A matter of politics not 
 aesthetics. Film and History: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Film and 
 Television Studies (35). 2, 8- 10 
van Rees.  M.A. (2001). Review of manifest rationality.  Argumentation 15, 231-37. 
Walsh , D. (2004).  Michael Moore’s contribution. Retrieved Nov. 6, 2005, from: 
 http://www.wsws.org/articles/2004/jun2004/911-j30.shtml. 
 119 
 
Warnick , B. (1987). The narrative paradigm: another story . Quarterly Journal of 
 Speech, 170-180. 
White, J. & Tyson, A (2005, October 26).  Military has lost 2,000 in Iraq.  The 
 Washington Post, p.  A01. 
Wilmington, M. (2004, June 25).  Ambush Moore takes on President Bush in 
 ‘Fahrenheit 9/11’ a  movie that fires a salvo at the White House ongoing 
 war on terror.  [Review of the documentary film Fahrenheit 9/11].  Chicago 
 Tribune.  Movies Section, pp. 1-4. 
Wilshire, P. (Summer 2005).  Michael Moore's Fahrenheit 9/11 and the U.S. election: 
 a case of missed opportunity?  Australian Screen Education (39), p129.  
York, B. (2005).  The passion of Michael Moore. National Review, 57, 47-9. 
Young, S.D. (1997, November).  Exemplifying a symbolic model of film viewing.  
 Poster  presented at the 1997 Convention of the National Communication 
 Association, Chicago, IL. 
Young, S.D. (2000). Movies as equipment for living: A developmental analysis of the 
 importance of film in everyday life. Critical Studies in Media Communication, 
 17(4),  447-468. 
Zarefsky, D. (2004).  Presidential rhetoric and the power of definition.  Presidential 
 Studies Quarterly 34(3): 607–19. 
 120 
 
Zengerle, J. (2004). Crashing the party: will Michael Moore turn on the democrats? 
 The New Republic, 231(3), 20-23. 
Zizek, S. (1996).  The plague of fantasies. New York: Verso 
Zizek, S. (2001). The fright of real tears: Krzystof Kieslowski between theory and 
 post-theory. London: British Film Institute.  
 
